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I. INTRODUCTION
About fifteen years ago, I wrote TRIPS and Its
Discontents' for a symposium commemorating the tenth
anniversary of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights2 (TRIPS Agreement). Held at
Marquette University Law School in April 2005, that event
was put together by my present colleague, Irene Calboli.3
At that time, developing countries were deeply discontent
with the TRIPS Agreement and the new and higher
intellectual property standards that the World Trade
Organization (WTO) had imposed upon them.4  The Fifth
1 Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L.
REV. 369 (2006).
2 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex IC, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS
Agreement].
3 Symposium, The First Ten Years of the TRIPs Agreement, 10 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 155 (2006); see also Irene Calboli, Foreword,
10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. i (2006) (providing a foreword to the
Symposium). The published version of the Symposium also included
Olufunmilayo Arewa, Graeme Dinwoodie, Sean Pager, Srividhya
Ragavan (now another colleague of mine), and Marco Ricolfi.
' See Yu, supra note 1, at 379-86 (explaining why developing countries
have been dissatisfied with the international intellectual property
regime).
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WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun (Cancun
Ministerial) had prematurely collapsed only two years
before, and WTO members voted to extend the transition
period for least developed countries for the first time
shortly before the Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference in
Hong Kong (Hong Kong Ministerial), my hometown, in
December 2005.6 When I did the final edits for the 2006
article, the Hong Kong Ministerial was still fresh in my
7memory.
5 Elizabeth Becker, Poorer Countries Pull Out of Talks Over World
Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2003, at Al; Editorial, The Cancfin
Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2003, at A24.
6 See Press Release, Word Trade Org., Poorest Countries Given More
Time to Apply Intellectual Property Rules (Nov. 29, 2005),
http://www.wto.org/english/newse/pres05_e/pr424_e.htm [https://per
ma.cc/5J57-7R2K] [hereinafter LDC Extension Press Release]
(reporting the WTO members' agreement to extend the transition
period for least developed countries for seven and a half years until
July 1, 2013, as long as the extension-seeking country has not yet met
the TRIPS requirements or has not already offered protection in excess
of those requirements). Since then, this transition period has been
further extended for another eight years until July 1, 2021, without the
earlier "non-rollback" commitment. Council for Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Extension of the Transition
Period Under Article 66.1 for Least Developed Country Members:
Decision of the Councilfor TRIPS of ]] June 2013, WTO Doc. IP/C/64
(June 12, 2013).
At the time of the Ministerial Conference, I participated in the Hong
Kong Trade and Development Symposium, a side event organized by
the Geneva-based International Centre for Trade and Sustainable
Development in coordination with the Hong Kong Fair Trade Fair
Steering Committee and the Faculty of Law of the University of Hong
Kong. See Peter K. Yu, Development Bridge over Troubled
Intellectual Property Water, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
DEVELOPMENT: UNDERSTANDING THE INTERFACES-LIBER AMICORUM
PEDRO RoFFE 97, 121 (Carlos Correa & Xavier Seuba eds., 2019)
[hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT] (recounting
the event).
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Fast forward fifteen years to April 12 and 13, 2019,
the time of the Second Annual Intellectual Property Redux
Conference and only two to three days before the twenty-
fifth anniversary of the TRIPS Agreement. Gone were the
developing countries' trenchant critiques of the TRIPS
Agreement or the attendant accusations of neo-
imperialism.8 In fact, the Agreement's silver anniversary
was largely a non-event. The lack of commemorative
activities surrounding this anniversary provided a sharp
contrast to the two major conferences held at the WTO and
the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
when the TRIPS Agreement hit wenty.9
What has happened? Have developing countries
successfully adjusted, or become sensitized, to the high
intellectual property standards in the TRIPS Agreement?
Have these countries and their supportive commentators
and nongovernmental organizations become tired of
criticizing the Agreement? Have developing countries and
their supporters moved on to more pressing issues in the
areas of intellectual property and international trade? Have
these countries been mistaken about the negative
ramifications of the TRIPS Agreement and finally figured
out that the Agreement could be beneficial after all?
Seeking answers to these questions, this Article
revisits the TRIPS developments in the past twenty-five
8 See infra notes 15-17 (providing sources that describe the TRIPS
Agreement as coercive, imperialistic, and harmful).
9 See generally THE MAKING OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: PERSONAL
INSIGHTS FROM THE URUGUAY ROUND NEGOTIATIONS (Jayashree
Watal & Antony Taubman eds., 2015) [hereinafter MAKING OF TRIPS
AGREEMENT] (providing personal recollections from individuals
involved in the TRIPS negotiations); TRIPS PLUS 20: FROM TRADE
RULES TO MARKET PRINCIPLES (Hanns Ullrich et al. eds., 2016)
[hereinafter TRIPS PLUS 20] (providing a commemorative collection of
articles on the TRIPS Agreement).
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years, with a primary focus on developing countries. Part I
explores why these countries have gradually shifted their
views from being discontent with the TRIPS Agreement to
being content with it.10 This Part offers five explanations
for this gradual shift. Like the 2006 article, in which I
offered four distinct accounts of the origins of the TRIPS
Agreement," I encourage readers to draw their own
conclusions on why developing countries changed their
perception and assessment.12
Part II turns to observations drawn from the
developing countries' engagement with the TRIPS
Agreement in the past twenty-five years. This Part focuses
on four observations that will inform not only the
Agreement's past but also the ongoing and future
development of the international intellectual property
regime. Part III concludes by identifying three active roles
that the TRIPS Agreement will continue to play in the near
future, from the developing countries' perspective. These
roles show how much the international intellectual property
regime has evolved in only a quarter-century.
10 See Frederick M. Abbott, Legislative and Regulatory Takings of
Intellectual Property: Early Stage Intervention Against a New
Jurisprudential Virus, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOP-
MENT, at 21, 22 ("Today, we more likely hear about preserving the
flexibilities inherent in the TRIPS Agreement than criticism of its
rules.").
" See Yu, supra note 1, at 371-79 (discussing the bargain, coercion,
ignorance, and self-interest narratives).
12 See id. at 379 ("[Ilnstead of attempting the impossible task of
suggesting which narrative is correct, th[e 2006] Article highlights the
tension between the different, and sometimes competing, narratives in
the hope that readers will have a better understanding of the
background behind the TRIPs negotiations and be able to draw their
own conclusions.").
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II. FROM DISCONTENTS TO CONTENTS
The TRIPS Agreement was signed in April 1994
and entered into effect on January 1, 1995.13 In its first
decade or so, the Agreement attracted major criticisms
from policymakers in developing countries,
nongovernmental organizations across the world, and
academic and policy commentators in both developed and
developing countries. Some of these commentators
characterized the TRIPS Agreement as coercive, 15
imperialistic,16 and harmful.17  Meanwhile, policymakers
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2.
1 See infra notes 15-17 (collecting sources that offer trenchant
critiques of the TRIPS Agreement).
15 See CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT AND THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 2 (2009) ("TRIPS became a
symbol of the vulnerability of developing countries to coercive
pressures from the most powerful developed countries and galvanized
critics regarding the influence of multinational corporations on global
economic rules."); GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & ROCHELLE C. DREYFUSS,
A NEOFEDERALIST VISION OF TRIPS: THE RESILIENCE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 33-34 (2012)
(discussing the coercion narrative); Donald P. Harris, TRIPS and
Treaties of Adhesion Part II: Back to the Past or a Small Step
Forward?, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REv. 185, 194-204 (characterizing the
TRIPS Agreement as a "treaty of adhesion"); Yu, supra note 1, at 373-
75 (discussing the coercion narrative).
16 See Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic,
Outdated, and Overprotective, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 613, 614
(1996) ("Far from being limited to trade relations, correcting the
international balance of trade, or lowering customs trade barriers,
TRIPS attempts to remake international copyright law in the image of
Western copyright law."); A. Samuel Oddi, TRIPS Natural Rights
and a "Polite Form of Economic Imperialism," 29 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 415 (1996) (considering the TRIPS Agreement as a
"polite form of economic imperialism"); J.H. Reichman, Intellectual
Property in International Trade: Opportunities and Risks of a GATT
Connection, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 747, 813 (1989) ("Imposition
of foreign legal standards on unwilling states in the name of
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and industry groups extolled the benefits of the Agreement,
especially in its early days. They also considered the
inclusion of intellectual property disputes in the mandatory
'harmonization' remains today what Ladas deemed it in 1975, namely,
a polite form of economic imperialism." (citing 1 STEPHEN P. LADAS,
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 14-15 (1975))); Peter K. Yu, The
International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827, 902 (2007)
("Because of power asymmetry, [the TRIPS] harmonization process
eventually became a Westernization, or Northernization, process.").
17 See Jagdish Bhagwati, What It Will Take to Get Developing
Countries into a New Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, in
DEP'T FOREIGN AFFS. & INT'L TRADE, TRADE POLICY RESEARCH 2001,
at 19, 21 (2001) (Can.) ("TRIPS does not involve mutual gain; rather, it
positions the WTO primarily as a collector of intellectual property-
related rents on behalf of multinational corporations."); Surendra J.
Patel, Can the Intellectual Property Rights System Serve the Interests of
Indigenous Knowledge?, in VALUING LOCAL KNOWLEDGE:
INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 305, 316
(Stephen B. Brush & Doreen Stabinsky eds., 1996) (arguing that the
TRIPS Agreement has made U.S. copyright law universal, harming the
interests of the developing world); WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC
PROSPECTS AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 2002: MAKING TRADE
WORK FOR THE WORLD'S POOR, at xvii (2002) (estimating that "rent
transfers to major technology-creating countries-particularly the
United States, Germany, and France-in the form of pharmaceutical
patents, computer chip designs, and other intellectual property, would
amount to more than $20 billion"); Yu, supra note 16, at 889 (noting
that the unquestioned adoption of foreign intellectual property
standards "might ... exacerbate the dire economic plight of less
developed countries by allowing foreign rights holders to crush local
industries through the threats of litigation, or even actual litigation"); J.
Michael Finger, The Doha Agenda and Development: A View from the
Uruguay Round 9 (Asian Dev. Bank, Econ. & Research Dep't,
Working Paper No. 21, 2002) (stating that "TRIPS developing
countries took on as legal obligation a cost of $60 billion per year").
See generally Peter M. Gerhart, The Tragedy of TRIPS, 2007 MICH. ST.
L. REv. 143, 158-62 (explaining why international negotiations are ill-
equipped to handle distributive issues).
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WTO dispute settlement process a crowning achievement
of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations.18
In recent years, however, the TRIPS Agreement
seems to have made a second, and markedly different,
impression, as the two sets of positions have gradually
swapped. While policymakers and industry groups in
developed countries have become increasingly
disappointed with the TRIPS Agreement, finding it
"primitive, constrained, inadequate, and ineffective," 19
those who used to criticize the Agreement seem to have
warmed up to it and become more content. Indeed, a
growing number of policymakers in developing countries
have used TRIPS standards to signify that their countries
have offered sufficient intellectual property protection and
enforcement.20
18 See Rachel Brewster, Shadow Unilateralism: Enforcing International
Trade Law at the WTO, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1133, 1134 (2009)
("Diplomats and trade negotiators have referred to the [Dispute
Settlement Understanding] as the 'crown jewel' of the WTO system.");
William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten
Years, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L. 17, 32 (2005) ("Dispute settlement is one of
the great successes of the WTO."); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss &
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the Uruguay Round:
Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 275
(1997) (noting that the two achievements of the Uruguay Round are, as
the title suggests, "Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together");
Molly Land, Rebalancing TRIPS, 33 MICH. J. INT'L L. 433, 445-61
(2012) (discussing why subjecting the TRIPS Agreement to trade
dispute resolution has restricted the policy space for tailoring national
intellectual property policies); Ruth Okediji, Toward an International
Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 75, 149-50 (2000)
("One of the most celebrated accomplishments of the WTO system is
the dispute resolution mechanism which adds legitimacy to the overall
design of the new trading system." (footnote omitted)).
19 Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles' Heel, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L.
479, 483 (2011).
20 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art 1.1 ("Members may, but
shall not be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive
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Focusing primarily on the developing countries'
shift from being discontent with the TRIPS Agreement to
being content with it,2 1 this Part offers five explanations for
this about turn. While each reason may only provide an
incomplete picture of this changing position, all five
reasons are relevant. They are offered alongside each other
so that readers can have a more complete picture and can
decide for themselves which explanation, or explanations,
is the most persuasive.
A. Everything Is Relative
The first explanation is that everything is relative.
Since the expiry of the transition period for developing
countries on January 1, 2000,22 developed countries began
expressing their disappointment with the lack of protection
and enforcement of intellectual property rights in their less
23developed counterparts. Many developed countries also
protection than is required by this Agreement, provided that such
protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement."
(emphasis added)); Antony Taubman, Australia's Interests Under
TRIPS Dispute Settlement: Trade Negotiations by Other Means,
Multilateral Defence of Domestic Policy Choice, or Safeguarding
Market Access?, 9 MELB. J. INT'L L. 217, 228 (2008) ("[T]he assertion
that legislation is 'TRIPS compliant' . . . served as a metonym-a
brand, even-of a country's willingness and capacity to provide a
regulatory regime that is receptive to the trade interests that defined
'new economy' or innovation-based models of growth and
prosperity.").
21 Although the scope and length of this Article do not allow for a
greater exploration of the developed countries' position shift, that
subject is no less important and equally instructive.
22 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 65.2 (providing developing
countries with a four-year transition period).
23 See Yu, Achilles' Heel, supra note 19, at 505 (noting the developed
countries' deep dissatisfaction with the continuous piracy and
counterfeiting problems in developing countries and explaining why
the former did not push for stronger international intellectual property
enforcement norms until the mid-2000s).
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noted their concerns about the deadlocks at the WTO,
which prevented the organization from further liberalizing
24trade. As United States Trade Representative (USTR)
Robert Zoellick noted famously, and disturbingly, after the
collapse of the Cancun Ministerial, the United States was
interested in separating the "can-do" countries from the
"won't-do" countries, and planned to "move towards free
trade with [only the former]."25
In the mid-2000s, the United States, the European
Union, Japan, and other developed countries began to
actively negotiate free trade and economic partnership
26agreements. These agreements have not only generated
new and higher protection and enforcement standards in the
intellectual property area, but have also steered
international norm-setting activities away from the WTO
and the World Intellectual Property Organization
24 See generally FATOUMATA JAWARA & AILEEN KWA, BEHIND THE
SCENES AT THE WTO: THE REAL WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS (updated ed. 2004) (examining the difficulties in the
WTO negotiations, with a focus on the failure of the Cancim
Ministerial); Cho Sungjoon, A Bridge Too Far: The Fall of the Fifth
WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun and the Future of Trade
Constitution, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 219 (2004) (providing a post-mortem
analysis of the failed Cancim Ministerial).
25 Robert B. Zoellick, America Will Not Wait for the Won't-Do
Countries, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 22, 2003, at 23.
26 See generally INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & FREE TRADE
AGREEMENTS (Christopher Heath & Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds.,
2007) (collecting articles that discuss free trade agreements in the
intellectual property context); Robert Burrell & Kimberlee Weatherall,
Exporting Controversy? Reactions to the Copyright Provisions of the
U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement: Lessons for U.S. Trade Policy,
2008 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 259 (criticizing the United States-
Australia Free Trade Agreement); Peter K. Yu, Currents and
Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property Regime, 38
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 323, 392-400 (2004) (discussing the growing use of
bilateral and regional trade agreements to push for higher intellectual
property standards).
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(WIPO). 27  While then WTO Director-General Pascal
Lamy expressed "concern about incoherence, confusion,
exponential increase of costs for business, unpredictability
and even unfairness in trade relations,,2 8 WIPO Director
General Francis Gurry worried that the parties negotiating
the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) 29 would
"tak[e] matters into their own hands to seek solutions
outside of the multilateral system to the detriment of
inclusiveness of the present system .30
To illustrate the strengthened protections offered by
TRIPS-plus bilateral, regional, plurilateral agreements,
27 See Ruth L. Okediji, Legal Innovation in International Intellectual
Property Relations: Revisiting Twenty-One Years of the TRIPS
Agreement, 36 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 191, 196 (2014) ("[T]he instability
generated by a new breed of plurilateral agreements has ushered
multilateral IP norm-setting, and the TRIPS Agreement specifically,
into an age of uncertainty."). See generally Peter K. Yu, The Non-
multilateral Approach to International Intellectual Property
Normsetting, in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A
HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 83, 86 (Daniel J. Gervais
ed., 2015) (discussing the TRIPS-plus standards in bilateral, regional,
and plurilateral trade agreements).
28 World Trade Org., Proliferation of Regional Trade Agreements
"Breeding Concern" Lamy (Sept. 10, 2007), https://www.wto.org/eng
lish/news e/sppl e/sppl67_e.htm [https://penna.cc/RKC5-XVG7].
29 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, opened for signature May 1,
2011, 50 I.L.M. 243 (2011) [hereinafter ACTA]. For my discussions of
this Agreement, see generally Peter K. Yu, The ACTA/TPP Country
Clubs, in ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE: 21ST CENTURY
CHALLENGES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND KNOWLEDGE
GOVERNANCE 258 (Dana Beldiman ed., 2013); Peter K. Yu, ACTA and
Its Complex Politics, 3 WIPO J. 1 (2011); Peter K. Yu, Enforcement,
Enforcement, What Enforcement?, 52 IDEA 239 (2012); Peter K. Yu,
Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMIU L. REv. 975
(2011) [hereinafter Yu, Six Secret Fears].
30 Catherine Saez, ACTA a Sign of Weakness in Multilateral System,
WIPO Head Says, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (June 30, 2010),
https://www.ip-watch.org/2010/06/30/acta-a-sign-of-weakness-in-multi
lateral-system-wipo-head-says [https://penna.cc/5LWR-J3ZN].
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consider the protections for undisclosed test or other data
that have been submitted to regulatory authorities for the
marketing approval of pharmaceutical and biological
products.3 1 Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement
introduced only two obligations relating to pharmaceutical
products: the protection "against unfair commercial use"
and the protection "against disclosure."3 2  Unlike Article
1711.6 of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), 3 3 the TRIPS provision does not stipulate the
minimum duration for such protection,34 nor does it prevent
31 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 39.3 (offering protection to
undisclosed test or other data for pharmaceutical products).
32 Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement provides:
Members, when requiring, as a condition of approving the marketing of
pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical products which utilize new
chemical entities, the submission of undisclosed test or other data, the
origination of which involves a considerable effort, shall protect such
data against unfair commercial use. In addition, Members shall protect
such data against disclosure, except where necessary to protect the
public, or unless steps are taken to ensure that the data are protected
against unfair commercial use.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Peter K. Yu, Data Exclusivities and the
Limits to TRIPS Harmonization, 46 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 641, 649-51
(2019) (discussing these two obligations).
33 Article 1711.6 of NAFTA explicitly states:
Each Party shall provide that for data . .. that are submitted to the Party
after the date of entry into force of this Agreement, no person other
than the person that submitted them may, without the latter's
permission, rely on such data in support of an application for product
approval during a reasonable period of time after their submission. For
this purpose, a reasonable period shall normally mean not less than five
years from the date on which the Party granted approval to the person
that produced the data for approval to market its product, taking
account of the nature of the data and the person's efforts and
expenditures in producing them.
North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 1711.6,
Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994)
[hereinafter NAFTA].
34 Compare id. ("[A] reasonable period shall normally mean not less
than five years from the date on which the Party granted approval to the
60 IDEA 149 (2020)
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countries from relying on data submitted by originators to
regulatory authorities.3 5
By contrast, the bilateral, regional, and plurilateral
trade agreements the United States negotiated in the 2000s
have included five years of minimum protection for
pharmaceutical test data.36 Labeled by commentators as
"TRIPS-plus,"3 7 these agreements require the signatories to
offer protections that go beyond the TRIPS requirements,
such as market exclusivity3 8 and data reliance.3 9  In the
person that produced the data for approval to market its product, taking
account of the nature of the data and the person's efforts and
expenditures in producing them."), with TRIPS Agreement, supra note
2, art. 39.3 (omitting the durational requirement). See also Yu, supra
note 32, at 651-52 (discussing the lack of a durational requirement in
Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement).
35 Compare TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 39.3, with NAFTA,
supra note 33, art. 1711.6 ("[N]o person other than the person that
submitted them may, without the latter's permission, rely on such data
in support of an application for product approval during a reasonable
period of time after their submission."). See also Yu, supra note 32, at
655-58 (discussing the lack of explicit language mentioning data
reliance in Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement).
36 See, e.g., Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade
Agreement, art. 15.10.1, Aug. 5, 2004, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-
america-fta/final-text [https://pena.cc/Y7BQ-R4HR]; United States-
Australia Free Trade Agreement, Austl.-U.S., art. 17.10.1, May 18,
2004, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/austra
lian-fta/final-text [https://pena.cc/T7AX-TRY6]; United States-
Singapore Free Trade Agreement, Sing.-U.S., art. 16.8.1, May 6, 2003,
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/singapore-fta/fi
nal-text [https://perma.cc/J5TP-BRPH].
37 See Yu, supra note 16, at 867-68 (discussing TRIPS-plus
provisions).
38 As I noted in an earlier article:
Although commentators often describe this regime as "data
exclusivity," the term "market exclusivity" is more accurate because
the TPP regime merely prevents the marketing of a new pharmaceutical
or agrochemical product based on the utilization of, or reliance on,
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mid-2010s, the adoption of the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP) Agreement further strengthened the obligations
regarding such protections.4 0 The TPP intellectual property
chapter also included new protections for the undisclosed
test or other data for biological products,4 an area not
covered by Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement.4 2
previously submitted test or other data. However, the regime does not
grant exclusive rights in the data, nor does it prevent the utilization of,
or reliance on, such data during the exclusivity term.
Yu, supra note 32, at 674-75 (footnote omitted).
39 See supra note 36 (providing the relevant treaty provisions).
40 See Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, art. 18.50, Feb. 4, 2016,
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-pa
rtnership/tpp-full-text [https://penna.cc/RT6J-GYDY] [hereinafter TPP
Agreement] (providing protection to undisclosed test or other data for
pharmaceutical products). For my discussions of the TPP, see
generally Peter K. Yu, The Investment-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, 66 AM. U. L. REv. 829 (2017); Peter K. Yu, Investor-
State Dispute Settlement and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE JUDICIARY 463 (Christophe Geiger
et al. eds., 2018); Peter K. Yu, The Alphabet Soup of Transborder
Intellectual Property Enforcement, 60 DRAKE L. REV. DISCOURSE 16,
24-28 (2012) [hereinafter Yu, Alphabet Soup]; Peter K. Yu, TPP and
Trans-Pacific Perplexities, 37 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1129 (2014)
[hereinafter Yu, TPP and Trans-Pacific Perplexities].
41 See TPP Agreement, supra note 40, art. 18.51 (providing protection
to undisclosed test or other data for biological products).
42 See Srividhya Ragavan, The (Re)Newed Barrier to Access to
Medication: Data Exclusivity, 51 AKRON L. REv. 1163, 1185 (2017)
("On the face of it, biologics are not included within the scope of
Article 39.3's requirement to protect new chemical entities. The [new
chemical entities] should not, by definition, include biologics."
(footnote omitted)); Yu, supra note 32, at 689-90 ("Article 39.3 of the
TRIPS Agreement does not grant protection to biologics because those
products are not considered 'new chemical entities' within the meaning
of the Agreement.").
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Although the TPP provisions for pharmaceutical
and biological products were suspended4 3 after the adoption
of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for
Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP),4 which replaced the
TPP Agreement following the United States' withdrawal,
the standard for biological products was strengthened once
again with the adoption of the United States-Mexico-
46Canada Agreement (USMCA). Seeking to replace
NAFTA, this Agreement protects undisclosed test or
other data for biological products "for a period of at least
ten years from the date of first marketing approval."
Lasting two years longer than the term stipulated in the
4 See Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership art. 2, Annex, Mar. 8, 2018, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/
en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements-concluded-but-no
t-in-force/cptpp/comprehensive-and-progressive-agreement-for-trans-p
acific-partnership-text [https://perma.cc/3W4C-T28F] (entered into
force Dec. 30, 2018) (suspending Articles 18.50 and 18.51 of the TPP
Agreement).
" Id.; see also Peter K. Yu, Thinking About the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (and a Mega-Regional Agreement on Life Support), 20
SMIU Sci. & TECH. L. REV. 97, 104-06 (2017) (discussing the CPTPP).
1 See Presidential Memorandum Regarding Withdrawal of the United
States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement,
82 Fed. Reg. 8497 (Jan. 23, 2017) (directing the USTR to "withdraw
the United States as a signatory to the [TPP and] . . . from TPP
negotiations"); see also Yu, supra note 44, at 101-10 (discussing the
United States' withdrawal from the TPP Agreement and its aftermath).




1 See Glenn Thrush, Trump Says He Plans to Withdraw from Nafta,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/02/us/
politics/trump-withdmw-nafta.html [https://perma.cc/4MCV-MGDH]
(reporting President Trump's announcement of his intention to
withdraw the United States from NAFTA).
4 USMCA, supra note 46, art. 20.49; see also Yu, supra note 32, at
682-83 (discussing Article 20.49 of the USMCA).
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TPP Agreement,49 the USMCA standard is now the high-
water mark of protection in this area, which many U.S.
legislators have found inappropriately high.0
When all of these slowly increasing standards are
taken into consideration, it is difficult not to be cynical
about the ongoing trajectory of international intellectual
property norm-setting. Recognizing that everything is
relative, Susan Sell, one of the most ardent critics of the
TRIPS Agreement, made the following observation around
the time of the ACTA negotiations:
Fifteen years ago, trade negotiators signed
off on the most comprehensive multilateral
intellectual property agreement in history. It
was both sweeping in scope and legally
binding. Hailed as a major change to
international market regulation at the time,
in retrospect, it looks like a relatively timid
' Compare TPP Agreement, supra note 40, art. 18.51, with USMCA,
supra note 46, art. 20.49.
5' As stated in a letter sent by more than 100 Democrat Congressional
representatives to United States Trade Representative Robert
Lighthizer:
Unless the USMCA text is amended, it would limit Congress' ability to
adjust the biologics exclusivity period, instead locking the US into
policies that keep cancer and other drug prices high while exporting
this model to Mexico, which has no additional exclusivity period for
biologics, and to Canada, which has an eight-year period.
Letter from Representative Jan Schakowsky et al. to Robert E.
Lighthizer, U.S. Trade Representative (July 11, 2019), https://
schakowsky.house.gov/uploads/lighthizermeds.pdf [https://penna.cc/
2BM9-ZD3J]; see also Allison Inserro, House Democrats Ask US
Trade Representative to Drop Biologics Language from USMCA, CTR.
FOR BIOSVILARS (July 12, 2019), https://www.centerforbiosimilars.
com/news/house-democrats-ask-us-trade-representative-to-drop-biologi
cs-language-from-usmca [https://perma.cc/6N73-JYU2] (reporting on
the letter).
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and permissive agreement. . . . Looking back
on the past fifteen years of intellectual
property norm setting and governance,
critics' initial objections to TRIPS look
almost mild, and I, for one, never imagined
that the original TRIPS would look so
good.51
Because a decade has now passed since Professor
Sell's observation, the TRIPS Agreement has likely
become even more "timid and permissive," especially when
compared against the CPTPP and the USMCA.
B. TRIPS Is Obsolete
The second explanation is that the TRIPS
Agreement is now obsolete. Even in the early days of this
Agreement, some commentators took the position that the
Agreement was obsolete upon arrival. As Marci Hamilton
observed in the mid-1990s:
Despite its broad sweep and its unstated
aspirations, TRIPS arrives on the scene
already outdated. TRIPS reached fruition at
51 Susan K. Sell, TRIPS Was Never Enough: Vertical Forum Shifting,
FTAs, ACTA, and TPP, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 447, 448 (2011).
Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan concurred:
The trend towards TRIPS-plus obligations in [free trade agreements]
has ... led to changes in the perception of TRIPS: initially viewed by
developing countries as serving primarily the interests of the
[intellectual property] exporting industries in the developed world,
TRIPS is now often praised for the flexibilities it offers. It seems that-
after fifteen years and in light of [ACTA] and other initiatives-TRIPS
is not so bad after all.
Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, The International Law Relation Between
TRIPS and Subsequent TRIPS-Plus Free Trade Agreements: Towards
Safeguarding TRIPS Flexibilities?, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 325, 328
(2011) (footnote omitted).
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the same time that the on-line era became
irrevocable. Yet it makes no concession, not
even a nod, to the fact that a significant
portion of the international intellectual
property market will soon be conducted on-
line. 52
Professor Hamilton's observation drew support
from the TRIPS negotiators' lack of interest in setting
52 Hamilton, supra note 16, at 614-15. Jerome Reichman concurred:
[The principal weakness of the TRIPS Agreement] stems from the
drafters' technical inability and political reluctance to address the
problems facing innovators and investors at work on important new
technologies in an Age of Information. The drafters' decision to stuff
these new technologies into the overworked and increasingly obsolete
patent and copyright paradigms simply ignores the systemic
contradictions and economic disutilities this same approach was
already generating in the domestic intellectual property systems.
J.H. Reichman, The Know-How Gap in the TRIPS Agreement: Why
Software Fared Badly, and What Are the Solutions, 17 HASTINGS
COMM./ENT. L.J. 763, 766 (1995) (footnote omitted). By contrast,
Patricia Judd is comfortable with the TRIPS Agreement's lack of
Internet-related provisions:
[T]he TRIPS Agreement is not the dinosaur that some perceive it to be.
Sure, it does not have overt, cutting edge provisions on tackling
Internet enforcement. Neither does any other instrument. In fact, trying
to tackle such an ever-changing phenomenon as Internet enforcement
through a treaty is ill-advised. No treaty, large or small, bilateral or
multilateral, regional or multinational, can hope to keep up with recent
and ongoing technological changes. What TRIPS does have is a
malleability that can aid it in keeping up with the times. It does not
need specific Internet-oriented provisions to be relevant in an Internet
age. In fact, given the perceived necessary specificity of those
provisions to tackle the problem of the moment, such provisions may
actually prove disadvantageous, falling by the wayside as the specific
tactics and technologies they address become outdated.
Patricia L. Judd, The TRIPS Balloon Effect, 46 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 471, 527 (2014) (footnote omitted).
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Internet-related intellectual property norms. 5 3 This lack of
interest is understandable considering that the TRIPS
Agreement "adjusted the level of intellectual property
protection to what was the highest common denominator
among major industrialized countries as of 1991."5 In the
early 1990s, the Internet had not yet entered the
mainstream. To some extent, the omission of Internet-
related norms in the TRIPS Agreement provided WIPO
with an opportunity to regain the momentum for
- * 55international intellectual property norm-setting. Less than
53 As Antony Taubman, the Director of the WTO Intellectual Property,
Government Procurement and Competition Division, recounted:
In 1986 the Internet was a limited tool for academics and researchers,
unknown to most of humanity who were largely oblivious to its
potential economic and social impact. And the very character of trade
was perceived essentially to concern transactions in physical objects
that passed across borders and could be counted and measured as
such-things you could drop on your foot, as the familiar parlance put
it.
Antony Taubman, Thematic Review: Negotiating "Trade-Related
Aspects" of Intellectual Property Rights, in MAKING OF TRIPS
AGREEMENT, supra note 9, at 15, 19-20; see also David Fitzpatrick,
Negotiating for Hong Kong, in MAKING OF TRIPS AGREEMENT, supra
note 9, at 285, 287 ("While copyright lawyers were alive to the dawn of
the digital era, and the convergence of television, computer and
telephone technology, the Internet was not then upon us. The
negotiators did not indulge in futurology."); Jagdish Sagar, Copyright:
An Indian Perspective, in MAKING OF TRIPS AGREEMENT, supra note
9, at 341, 347 ("It seems odd, looking back, that the Internet never
figured in the TRIPS negotiations: at least, I do not remember any
mention of it and the treaty itself took no account of it.").
Daniel J. Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Round:
History and Impact on Economic Development, in 4 INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE
DIGITAL AGE 23, 43 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007) [hereinafter
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH]; see also id. at
29 ("The 1992 text was not extensively modified and became the basis
for the TRIPS Agreement adopted at Marrakesh on April 15, 1994.").
5 See Yu, supra note 26, at 367-75 (discussing efforts to regain the
momentum for international intellectual property norm-setting); see
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two years after the Agreement's adoption, WIPO
established the WIPO Copyright Treaty56 and the WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty. This U.N.
specialized agency also initiated the WIPO Internet
Domain Name Process.
An area that Professor Hamilton did not mention,
and one to which TRIPS negotiators also did not pay
sufficient attention, was the TRIPS Agreement's limited
coverage of biotechnology. Although the biotechnology
revolution has been proceeding very rapidly since the
1980s, thanks in part to the United States Supreme Court
decision of Diamond v. Chakrabarty,59 the Agreement
includes only two sub-provisions addressing the policy and
ethical concerns sparked by this revolution.6 0  Echoing
also Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Architecture of the International
Intellectual Property System, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 993, 1005 (2002)
("[T]he sudden emergence of the WTO as part of the international
intellectual property lawmaking process seemed to energize WIPO,
resulting in the conclusion of several new treaties in copyright, patent
and trademark law, as well as the reorganization . .. designed to make
WIPO fit for the twenty-first century." (footnotes omitted)).
56 World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20,
1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 121.
World Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phono-
grams Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 203.
5 8 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., THE MANAGEMENT OF INTERNET
NAMES AND ADDRESSES: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES: FINAL
REPORT OF THE WIPO INTERNET DOMAIN NAME PROCESS (1999);
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., THE RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS AND
THE USE OF NAMES IN THE INTERNET DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM: REPORT
OF THE SECOND WIPO INTERNET DOMAIN NAME PROCESS (2001).
59 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
60 A key concern at that time was the patentability of isolated human
genes and genetically-engineered microorganisms. For discussions of
this issue, see generally Margo A. Bagley, A Global Controversy: The
Role of Morality in Biotechnology Patent Law, in 2 INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH, supra note 54, at 317; Li
Yahong, Human Gene Patenting and Its Implications for Medical
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Article 53(a) of the European Patent Convention,61 Article
27.2 of the TRIPS Agreement allows WTO members to
"exclude from patentability inventions . . . [when it] is
necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to
protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid
serious prejudice to the environment.",6 2  Article 27.3(b)
also permits members to exclude from patentability "plants
and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially
biological processes for the production of plants or animals
other than non-biological and microbiological processes."6 3
Notwithstanding these two sub-provisions, the TRIPS
Agreement did not anticipate many of the latest
developments in the biotechnology area. Had it been
otherwise, the negotiations on the provisions relating to the
treatment of biologics might have been less controversial at
the TPP and other negotiations.65
Research, in 2 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH,
supra note 54, at 347.
61 See Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 53(a), Oct. 5,
1973, as amended by Decision of the Administration Council of the
European Patent Organization of Dec. 21, 1978, 1065 U.N.T.S. 255,
272 (excluding from protection those inventions "the publication or
exploitation of which would be contrary to ordre public or morality").
62 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 27.2.
63 Id. art. 27.3(b).
64 See Antonio Gustavo Trombetta, Negotiating for Argentina, in
MAKING OF TRIPS AGREEMENT, supra note 9, at 257, 260 (noting that
"[b]iotechnology was a relatively new field and international
experience was scarce"); see also J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to
Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 11, 36-37 (1996) (stating that it is "unlikely
that states could use the WTO framework to oblige other states to adopt
high levels of patent protection for [biotechnological] inventions for the
foreseeable future").
65 See Frederick M. Abbott, The Evolution of Public Health Provisions
in Preferential Trade and Investment Agreements of the United States,
in CURRENT ALLIANCES IN INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAWMAKING: THE EMERGENCE AND IMPACT OF MEGA-REGIONALS 45,
55 (Pedro Roffe & Xavier Seuba eds., 2017) (noting that "negotiation
Volume 60 - Number 1
170 IDEA - The Law Review of the Franklin Pierce Center for Intellectual Property
The third area that is relevant to the discussion, and
that TRIPS negotiators largely ignored, involves protection
for traditional knowledge and traditional cultural
66expressions. To be fair to these negotiators, the WIPO
of the duration of the biologics exclusivity period was perhaps the most
controversial part of the TPP negotiations"); Burcu Kilic & Courtney
Pine, Inside Views: Decision Time on Biologics Exclusivity: Eight
Years Is No Compromise, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (July 27, 2015),
http://www.ip-watch.org/2015/07/27/decision-time-on-biologics-exclus
ivity-eight-years-is-no-compromise [https://perma.cc/5BAE-5K98]
("As the Trans-Pacific Partnership . . . negotiations approach their
endgame, biologics exclusivity is still considered 'one of the most
difficult outstanding issues in the negotiation."').
6 As Piragibe dos Santos Tarrag6, the chief TRIPS negotiator for
Brazil, recounted:
Brazil is one of the world's largest agricultural producers, and its local
communities have been using the fruits of the country's immense
biodiversity for medicinal and fanning purposes, through traditional
knowledge. So it was quite natural that Brazil kept the matter under
close scrutiny and that it saw it as in its interests that no new standard
should be created in haste. In the end, despite extending considerably
the frontiers of patentability, the TRIPS negotiators were not able to
find appropriate answers to resolve the quandary of the compatibility
with the criteria for patent protection and their application to living
materials in a manner that could also take into account the genuine
concerns of farmers and holders of traditional knowledge.
Piragibe dos Santos Tarrag6, Negotiating for Brazil, in MAKING OF
TRIPS AGREEMENT, supra note 9, at 239, 246; see also A.V. Ganesan,
Negotiating for India, in MAKING OF TRIPS AGREEMENT, supra note 9,
at 211, 229-30 (noting that the "recognition and rewarding of
traditional knowledge of indigenous communities" was "outside the
purview of the TRIPS Agreement"). For my discussions of traditional
knowledge and traditional cultural expressions, see generally Peter K.
Yu, Cultural Relics, Intellectual Property, and Intangible Heritage, 81
TEMP. L. REv. 433 (2008); Peter K. Yu, Traditional Knowledge,
Intellectual Property, and Indigenous Culture: An Introduction, 11
CARDOZO J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 239 (2003). See also Symposium,
Traditional Knowledge, Intellectual Property, and Indigenous Culture,
11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 239 (2003) (providing the first
academic symposium on traditional knowledge and traditional cultural
expressions in a U.S. law school).
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Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore
was not established until September 2000, more than five
67years after the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement. Even
with the establishment of this intergovernmental
committee, it took a few more years before developing
countries advanced their so-called Article 29bis proposal,
which would require patent applicants to disclose the
traditional knowledge and genetic resources used in their
inventions.6 8 Notwithstanding these late-occurring
developments, the protection of traditional knowledge and
traditional cultural expressions was not new-even at the
beginning of the TRIPS negotiations. Such protection can
be traced back to the adoption of the Tunis Model Law on
69Copyright in 1976, or even earlier to the African Study
Conference on Copyright in Brazzaville, Congo in August
1963.70
67 Intergovernmental Committee (IC, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/igc [https://penna.cc/Z6JS-829A] (last
visited July 30, 2018). See generally PROTECTING TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE: THE WIPO INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GENETIC RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE (Daniel F. Robinson et al. eds., 2017)
(collecting articles that offer detailed analyses of the Intergovernmental
Committee's effort).
68 See Communication from Brazil, China, Colombia, Cuba, India,
Pakistan, Peru, Thailand, and Tanzania, Doha Work Programme-The
Outstanding Implementation Issue on the Relationship Between the
TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity, WTO
Doc. WT/GC/W/564/Rev.2 (July 5, 2006).
69 TUNIS MODEL LAW ON COPYRIGHT (1976), reprinted in 12
COPYRIGHT 165 (1976); see also Paul Kuruk, Protecting Folklore
Under Modern Intellectual Property Regimes: A Reappraisal of the
Tensions Between Individual and Communal Rights in Africa and the
United States, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 769, 813-17 (1999) (discussing the
Tunis Model Law on Copyright).
71 See Monika Dommann, Lost in Tradition? Reconsidering the History
of Folklore and Its Legal Protection Since 1800, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND TRADITIONAL CULTURAL EXPRESSIONS IN A DIGITAL
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Finally, the past decade alone has seen the
emergence of many new technologies, including "digital
communication, Big Data, [the] Internet of Things, 3D
printing, blockchains, artificial intelligence, robotics,
autonomous vehicles, nanotechnology, and synthetic
biology." 7 1  To be sure, it would be unrealistic to expect
international agreements to be able to keep pace with all of
the latest technological developments, especially
considering the usual cat-and-mouse chase between
international agreements and such developments.7 2
ENVIRONMENT 3, 11 (Christoph Beat Graber & Mira Burri-Nenova
eds., 2008) (tracing the protection of folklore to the Brazzaville
Conference); Peter K. Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, 35
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 465, 473 (2009) (noting the introduction of "special
provisions for the protection of African folklore" as one of the three
specific recommendations at the Brazzaville Conference). For
discussions of the Brazzaville Conference, see generally SAM
RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND
NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND 888-
90 (2d ed. 2005); Charles F. Johnson, The Origins of the Stockholm
Protocol, 18 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 91, 103-08 (1970).
71 Peter K. Yu, A Half-Century of Scholarship on the Chinese
Intellectual Property System, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1045, 1089 (2018).
72 See Colin B. Picker, A View from 40,000 Feet: International Law
and the Invisible Hand of Technology, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 149, 184
(2001) ("[D]elay is the rule in the formation of international law.
Usually, international law is created over long periods, by the gradual
acceptance of customary state practice or after long treaty
negotiations."); Peter K. Yu, Trade Agreement Cats and the Digital
Technology Mouse, in SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW: BALANCING COMPETING INTERESTS 185, 202 (Bryan
Mercurio & Ni Kuei-Jung eds., 2014) ("[F]rom initial negotiation to
final ratification to full implementation, it takes a considerable amount
of time, effort, energy, and resources to complete a trade agreement.
The rate at which such an agreement is developed can hardly keep pace
with the rate of technological change."). But see Patricia L. Judd,
Toward a TRIPS Truce, 32 MICH. J. INT'L L. 613, 615-16 (2011)
("TRIPS contains features that give it the pliability necessary to keep
up with the times, adapting to an intellectual property environment
driven by the internet and by a decreasing emphasis on territoriality.
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Nevertheless, the emergence of these technologies does
suggest that the TRIPS Agreement may no longer be at the
center of the international intellectual property debate, at
least as far as new technologies are concerned. With the
ongoing efforts to address some of these technological
issues under the electronic commerce or digital trade
umbrella, one may also wonder if and how these efforts
will ultimately affect the protections offered by the TRIPS
Agreement.73
C. TRIPS Is Flexible
The third explanation is that the TRIPS Agreement
is more flexible than what policymakers and commentators
have given it credit for. Since the Agreement's adoption,
Graeme Dinwoodie and Rochelle Dreyfuss have done
important work articulating the benefits of viewing this
Agreement through a neo-federalist lens.7 As they
observed:
We do not subscribe to the supranational
code view of the TRIPS Agreement. Rather,
we see the Agreement as reflecting a
The TRIPS Agreement is both more equitable and more malleable than
its longtime reputation suggests.").
73 See Mira Burri, The Governance of Data and Data Flows in Trade
Agreements: The Pitfalls of Legal Adaptation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REv.
65, 77-99 (2017) (discussing the digital trade issues at the WTO);
Henry Gao, Digital or Trade? The Contrasting Approaches of China
and US to Digital Trade, 21 J. INT'L ECON. L. 297, 318-20 (2018)
(discussing the different approaches to digital trade by China and the
United States); Peter K. Yu, Fitting Machine-Generated Data into
Trade Regulatory Holes, in THE TRADE IN KNOWLEDGE: ECONOMIC,
LEGAL AND POLICY ASPECTS (Antony Taubman & Jayashree Watal
eds., Cambridge Univ. Press, forthcoming 2020) (discussing how the
protection, regulation, and overall governance of machine-generated
data may not fit well with the existing international trade regime).
DINWOODIE & DREYFUSS, supra note 15.
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different paradigm in knowledge
governance, which we term a "neofederalist
regime." In our view, member states retain
considerable discretion under TRIPS, but
agree to operate within an international
framework. This framework is substantially
less powerful than the central administration
of a federal government. However, it is
federalist in the sense that the regime
comprises a series of substantive and
procedural commitments that promote the
coordination of both the present intellectual
property system and future international
intellectual property lawmaking. Thus,
while we recognize that TRIPS negotiators
reached a series of compromises among the
social and technological policies of
countries with different cultures, education
levels, and economic needs, we see these
compromises not as a code, but rather as
defining the parameters of national
autonomy.
In the past two decades, policymakers,
commentators, and nongovernmental organizations have
worked hard to expand the flexibilities found in the TRIPS
Agreement and the WTO.7 6 While it is impossible to list
all the experts who have made important contributions in
75 Id. at 5-6.
76 See Yu, supra note 16, at 869-70 (discussing the limitations,
flexibilities, and public interest safeguards in the TRIPS Agreement).
For commentaries emphasizing the flexibilities within the TRIPS
Agreement, see generally CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED
ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY ON
THE TRIPS AGREEMENT (2d ed. 2020); UNCTAD-ICTSD PROJECT ON
INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS & SUSTAINABLE DEV., RESOURCE BOOK
ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT (2005) [hereinafter RESOURCE BOOK].
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this area -from both developed and developing
countries-one project that has captured this effort well is
the Resource Book on TRIPS and Development, put
together by the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development and the Geneva-based International Centre
for Trade and Sustainable Development.78 As I noted in
the 2006 article:
Conceived as a practical guide to the TRIPs
Agreement, the book seeks to improve
understanding of the development
implications of the Agreement. It offers
detailed analysis of each provision of the
Agreement and highlights areas in which the
Agreement leaves WTO member states
"wiggle room" to pursue their own policy
objectives based on their levels of
development.79
For illustrative purposes, consider the many
flexibilities that the TRIPS Agreement has retained in the
pharmaceutical area. As Frederick Abbott reminded us:
The TRIPS Agreement . . . does not ...
restrict the authority of governments to
regulate prices. It . . . permits [compulsory
7 See SAM F. HALABI, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: OLIGOPOLY, REGULATION, AND
WEALTH REDISTRIBUTION IN THE GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 63
(2018) (listing scholars who have actively engaged in advocacy and
scholarly exploration regarding the TRIPS Agreement).
7 RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 76.
7 Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, supra note 1, at 369; see also
Reichman, Fair Followers, supra note 64, at 28 (contending that "the
TRIPS Agreement leaves developing countries ample 'wiggle room' in
which to implement national policies favoring the public interest in free
competition").
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or government use licenses] to be granted.
It permits governments to authorize parallel
importation. The TRIPS Agreement does
not specify that new-use patents must be
granted. It allows patents to be used for
regulatory approval purposes, and it does
not require the extension of patent terms to
offset regulatory approval periods. The
TRIPS Agreement provides a limited form
of protection for submissions of regulatory
data; but this protection does not prevent a
generic producer from making use of
publicly available information to generate
bioequivalence test data. The TRIPS
Agreement provides substantial discretion
for the application of competition laws.80
To a large extent, the developed countries' efforts to
set new and higher intellectual property standards through
bilateral, regional, and plurilateral trade negotiations were
strategically designed to remove these flexibilities.81
In a recent article, I explained how the
disagreements between developed and emerging countries
in international intellectual property norm-setting have
resulted in the creation of "contestation-driven
flexibilities," which provide developing countries with
benefits that are comparable to the "consensus-based
flexibilities" found in the TRIPS Agreement.82 A case in
8o Frederick M. Abbott, The Cycle of Action and Reaction:
Developments and Trends in Intellectual Property and Health, in
NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO
MEDICINES 27, 30 (Pedro Roffe et al. eds., 2006) (citations omitted).
81 See Yu, International Enclosure Movement, supra note 16, at 866-
70 (discussing TRIPS-plus enclosure of the developing countries'
policy space in the intellectual property area).
82 Yu, supra note 32, at 703-04.
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point concerns the differing international intellectual
property standards in the TPP Agreement and the draft
intellectual property chapter of the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)
Agreement.83 While these two agreements are unlikely to
have precipitated any major direct conflicts, due to the fact
that both agreements aim to establish international
minimum standards,84 the disagreements between the TPP
and RCEP negotiating parties and the lack of international
83 Single Working Document on the Intellectual Property Chapter
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Free Trade
Agreement, https://www.keionline.org/wp-content/uploads/RCEP-IP-
Chapter- 150ctober2015.docx [https://perna.cc/P6P8-JXJM] (provid-
ing the unofficial October 15, 2015 draft of the RCEP intellectual
property chapter); see also James Love, 2015 Oct 15 Version: RCEP IP
Chapter, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT'L (Apr. 19, 2016),
https://www.keionline.org/23060 [https://perma.cc/JF2Q-2NWQ] (pro-
viding the leaked text). For my discussions of the RCEP negotiations,
see generally Peter K. Yu, The RCEP Negotiations and Asian
Intellectual Property Norm Setters, in THE FUTURE OF ASIAN TRADE
DEALS AND IP 85 (Liu Kung-Chung & Julien Chaisse eds., 2019); Peter
K. Yu, TPP, RCEP, and the Crossvergence of Asian Intellectual
Property Standards, in GOVERNING SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY UNDER
THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: REGULATORY DIVERGENCE
AND CONVERGENCE IN THE AGE OF MEGAREGIONALS 277 (Peng Shin-
yi et al. eds., 2018) [hereinafter Yu, Crossvergence]; Peter K. Yu, TPP,
RCEP and the Future of Copyright Norm-setting in the Asian Pacific,
in MAKING COPYRIGHT WORK FOR THE ASIAN PACIFIC: JUXTAPOSING
HARMONISATION WITH FLEXIBILITY 19 (Susan Corbett & Jessica C. Lai
eds., 2018) [hereinafter Yu, Copyright Norm-setting]; Peter K. Yu, The
RCEP and Trans-Pacific Intellectual Property Norms, 50 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 673 (2017) [hereinafter Yu, RCEP and Trans-Pacific
Norms].
8 See Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Battle to Define
Asia's Intellectual Property Law: From TPP to RCEP, 8 U.C. IRVINE
L. REV. 331, 333 (2018) (discussing the struggle between the TPP and
the RCEP and its implications for Asia); Yu, Crossvergence, supra
note 83, at 290-91 (discussing the rivalry between the TPP and the
RCEP); Yu, Copyright Norm-setting, supra note 83, at 42-45
(discussing the battle between the TPP, the CPTPP, and the RCEP).
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consensus in the areas implicating such disagreements have
provided an additional layer of flexibilities to the
developing countries' benefit.
Finally, flexibilities can be developed outside the
TRIPS Agreement, the intellectual property field, or even
the WTO. Sam Halabi coined the term "intellectual
property shelters" to illustrate the many active
developments that have now taken place in the international
arena.85  Taking advantage of the developing countries'
regime-shifting efforts8 6 and utilizing "the language of
biodiversity, public health, and food security," these
shelters have provided an under-analyzed "body of
international economic law that . . . has emerged in
response to intellectual property protections expanding
,,87through trade and investment agreements. Examples of
these shelters include the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness
Framework developed under the auspices of the World
Health Organization (WHO),88 the Nagoya Protocol on
Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable
Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization to the
Convention on Biological Diversity,8 and the WHO
HALABI, supra note 77, at iii.
86 For discussions of "forum shifting" or "regime shifting" strategies,
see generally JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL
BusiNEss REGULATION 564-71 (2000); Laurence R. Helfer, Regime
Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International
Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2004); Yu,
supra note 26, at 408-16.
87 HALABI, supra note 77, at iii.
8 World Health Organization [WHO], Pandemic Influenza Prepa-
redness: Sharing of Influenza Viruses and Access to Vaccines and
Other Benefits, World Health Assembly Res. WHA64.5 (May 24,
2011), http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf iles/WHA64/A64_R5-en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VQ6D-MYD7]; see also HALABI, supra note 77, at
162-65 (discussing this framework as an intellectual property shelter).
89 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization to the
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Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.90 Although
Professor Halabi did not include among his examples
activities in the human rights area91-due perhaps to
insufficient space or a lack of formal shelter-related
- 92-initiatives-I would have included those activities, given
Convention on Biological Diversity (Oct. 29, 2010),
http://www.cbd.int/abs/doc/protocol/nagoya-protocol-en.pdf [https://
perma.cc/99BD-5EHQ]; see also HALABI, supra note 77, at 175-84
(discussing this protocol as an intellectual property shelter).
90 WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, May 21, 2003,
2302 U.N.T.S 166; see also HALABI, supra note 77, at 189-97
(discussing this framework as an intellectual property shelter).
91 Some of the key documents in this area, in chronological order,
include: Sub-Comm'n on Human Rights Res. 2000/7, Intellectual
Property Rights and Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2000/7 (Aug. 17, 2000); Sub-Comm'n on Human
Rights Res. 2001/21, Intellectual Property and Human Rights, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2001/21 (Aug. 16, 2001); U.N. Econ. & Soc.
Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment
No. 17: The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the
Moral and Material Interests Resulting from Any Scientific, Literary or
Artistic Production of Which He or She Is the Author (Article 15,
Paragraph 1(c), of the Covenant), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (Jan. 12,
2006); Farida Shaheed (Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural
Rights), Copyright Policy and the Right to Science and Culture, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/28/57 (Dec. 24, 2014); Farida Shaheed (Special
Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights), Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc.
A/70/279 (Aug. 4, 2015).
92 For my discussions of the tension between intellectual property and
human rights, see generally Peter K. Yu, Biobanking, Scientific
Productions and Human Rights, in GLOBAL GENES, LOCAL CONCERNS:
LEGAL, ETHICAL, AND SCIENTIFIC CHALLENGES IN INTERNATIONAL
BIOBANKING 73 (Timo Minssen et al. eds., 2019); Peter K. Yu,
Challenges to the Development of a Human Rights Framework for
Intellectual Property, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 87 (Paul L.C. Torremans ed., 4th ed., forthcoming 2020); Peter
K. Yu, Digital Copyright Enforcement Measures and Their Human
Rights Threats, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 455 (Christophe Geiger ed., 2015); Peter K.
Yu, Intellectual Property, Human Rights and Methodological
Reflections, in HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RESEARCH
Volume 60 - Number 1
180 IDEA - The Law Review of the Franklin Pierce Center for Intellectual Property
their importance to the intellectual property field and their
heavy reliance on regime-shifting efforts to create
"counterregime norms."9 3  When all of these inter- and
cross-regime developments are considered together, they
have assisted in preserving the flexibilities developing
countries fought hard to retain during the TRIPS
negotiations. They have also strengthened the developing
countries' ability to resist the developed countries'
incessant demands for increased intellectual property
protection and enforcement.94
(Irene Calboli & Lilli Montagnani eds., Oxford University Press,
forthcoming 2020); Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Human Rights
and Public-Private Partnerships, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
GOVERNANCE, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 398 (Margaret Chon,
Pedro Roffe & Ahmed Abdel-Latif eds., 2018); Peter K. Yu,
Intellectual Property and Human Rights 2.0, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. 1375
(2019); Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and Human Rights in the
Nonmultilateral Era, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1045 (2012); Peter K. Yu,
Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests in a Human Rights
Framework, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1039 (2007); Peter K. Yu, Ten
Common Questions About Intellectual Property and Human Rights, 23
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 709 (2007); Peter K. Yu, The Anatomy of the
Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property, 69 SMIU L. REV.
37 (2016).
93 See Donald J. Puchala & Raymond F. Hopkins, International
Regimes: Lessons from Inductive Analysis, in INTERNATIONAL
REGIMES 61, 66 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983) (defining
"counterregime norms" as norms that "either circulate in the realm of
rhetoric or lie dormant as long as those who dominate the existing
regime preserve their power and their consequent ability to reward
compliance and punish deviance"); Helfer, supra note 86, at 14
(defining "counter-regime norms" as "binding treaty rules and
nonbinding soft law standards that seek to alter the prevailing legal
landscape").
94 See P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ & RUTH L. OKEDIJI, CONCEIVING AN
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT ON LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO
COPYRIGHT: FINAL REPORT 41 (2008), https://www.eifl.net/sites/
default/files/resources/201409/conceiving_an i ternational instrument
on limitiations-and exceptions tocopyright.pdf [https://perma.cc/
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D. TRIPS Does Not Harmonize
The fourth explanation is that the TRIPS Agreement
fails to harmonize the diverging national intellectual
property standards of WTO members. Although
international harmonization has always been described as a
goal, this Agreement actually has not harmonized
intellectual property laws as much as we have assumed.9 5
As Susy Frankel provocatively noted, "TRIPS did not
harmonize and, as its negotiating history shows, could not
have harmonized many intellectual property standards."9 6
8HJV-BFN9] (underscoring "the suitability of using multiple
international institutions for the development of the new multilateral
framework on [limitations and exceptions], as such an approach may
benefit from norm competition across different fora as well as from
inter-agency competition and collaboration"); Peter K. Yu, Virotech
Patents, Viropiracy, and Viral Sovereignty, 45 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1563,
1637 (2013) ("[F]ragmentation will allow less developed countries to
better protect their interests by mobilizing in favorable fora, laying
down the needed political and diplomatic groundwork, and establishing
new 'counter-regime norms' that help restore the balance of the
international intellectual property system.").
95 For discussions of the harmonization process, see generally John F.
Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 685 (2002); Amy Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its
Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS Implementation in India's
Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1571 (2009); Yu, supra note
26, at 429-35; Peter K. Yu, The Harmonization Game: What
Basketball Can Teach About Intellectual Property and International
Trade, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 218 (2003).
96 Susy Frankel, The Fusion of Intellectual Property and Trade, in
FRAMING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
INTEGRATING INCENTIVES, TRADE, DEVELOPMENT, CULTURE, AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 89, 102 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Elizabeth Siew-
Kuan Ng eds., 2018); see also Yu, supra note 32, at 702 (noting that
"one should be cautious when evaluating the successes and limitations
of the TRIPS harmonization project").
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To be sure, the TRIPS Agreement has had far-
reaching impacts on developing countries, sparking
concerns and discontents. Nevertheless, most of the
harmonization efforts originate in the Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention)9 7
and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works (Berne Convention).98 Established in the
1880s, both conventions predated the TRIPS Agreement by
more than a century before they were finally incorporated
into the Agreement.9 9 If anything, the TRIPS Agreement
has merely amplified the harmonization efforts driven by
these two cornerstone instruments.
As far as new intellectual property norm-setting is
concerned, two sets of TRIPS norms stand out. The first
set concerns intellectual property enforcement.100 As the
97 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20,
1883, 21 U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (last revised at Stockholm
July 14, 1967) [hereinafter Paris Convention].
98 Beme Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (last revised at Paris July 24, 1971)
[hereinafter Beme Convention].
99 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 2.1 ("In respect of Parts II,
III and IV of this Agreement, Members shall comply with Articles 1
through 12, and Article 19, of the Paris Convention (1967)."); id. art.
9.1 ("Members shall comply with Articles I through 21 of the Beme
Convention (1971) and the Appendix thereto.").
100 See Carlos M. Correa, The Push for Stronger Enforcement Rules:
Implications for Developing Countries, in THE GLOBAL DEBATE ON
THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 27, 34 (Int'l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable
Dev. ed., 2009) ("The TRIPS Agreement is the first international treaty
on IPRs [intellectual property rights] that has included specific norms
on the enforcement of IPRs." (footnote omitted)); DANIEL GERVAIS,
THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 440 (3d
ed. 2008) ("The enforcement section of the TRIPS Agreement is clearly
one of the major achievements of the negotiation."); RESOURCE BOOK,
supra note 76, at 629 ("The introduction of a detailed set of
enforcement rules as part of TRIPS has been ... one of the major
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WTO panel observed in United States Section 211
Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998:
The inclusion of [Part III] on enforcement in
the TRIPS Agreement was one of the major
accomplishments of the Uruguay Round
negotiations as it expanded the scope of
enforcement aspect of intellectual property
rights. Prior to the TRIPS Agreement,
provisions related to enforcement were
limited to general obligations to provide
legal remedies and seizure of infringing
goods. o
With twenty-one provisions on obligations ranging
from civil and administrative remedies to border measures
innovations of this Agreement."); Adrian Otten & Hannu Wager,
Compliance with TRIPS: The Emerging World View, 29 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 391, 403 (1996) ("[The enforcement] rules constitute
the first time in any area of international law that such rules on
domestic enforcement procedures and remedies have been
negotiated.").
101 Panel Report, United States Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations
Act of 1998 ¶ 8.97, WTO Doc. WT/DS176/R (adopted Aug. 6, 2001).
As I noted in an earlier article:
[T]he enforcement provisions in [the Paris and Beme Conventions] are
generally rare and piecemeal. These provisions include Articles 13(3),
15 and 16 of the Beme Convention and Articles 9, 10(1), l0bis and
10ter of the Paris Convention. All of these provisions have been largely
limited to the seizure of goods upon importation, the institution of
infringement proceedings, and the right to obtain appropriate legal
remedies.
Peter K. Yu, Enforcement: A Neglected Child in the Intellectual
Property Family, in THE INTERNET AND THE EMERGING IMPORTANCE
OF NEW FORMS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 279, 294-95 (Susy
Frankel & Daniel Gervais eds., 2016); see also Yu, Achilles' Heel,
supra note 19, at 486 (discussing Articles 9, 10(1), l0bis, and 10ter of
the Paris Convention and Articles 13(3), 15, and 16 of the Beme
Convention).
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to criminal sanctions,102 "the TRIPS Agreement, for the
first time, provides comprehensive international minimum
standards on the enforcement of intellectual property
rights."103 Nevertheless, these new standards have not been
very effective, and some commentators have referred to
them as the "Achilles' [h]eel of the TRIPS Agreement."to4
Had these provisions been more successful, developed
countries would not have been so disappointed that they
and their likeminded trading partners moved outside the
WTO and WIPO to negotiate ACTA. 10 As Jeffery Atik
reminded us, "ACTA is a critique of TRIPS-its very core
signals a diagnosis that TRIPS inadequately addressed the
problem of [intellectual property] enforcement."10 6
The second area in which TRIPS negotiators sought
to set new norms relates to undisclosed test or other data
that have been submitted to regulatory authorities for the
marketing approval of pharmaceutical and agrochemical
102 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 41-61.
103 Yu, Achilles' Heel, supra note 19, at 481-82.
104 J.H. Reichman & David Lange, Bargaining Around the TRIPS
Agreement: The Case for Ongoing Public-Private Initiatives to
Facilitate Worldwide Intellectual Property Transactions, 9 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 11, 34-40 (1998); see also Yu, Achilles' Heel, supra
note 19 (explaining why the enforcement provisions are the "Achilles'
heel of the TRIPS Agreement").
105 See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative,
Ambassador Schwab Announces U.S. Will Seek New Trade
Agreement to Fight Fakes (Oct. 23, 2007), https://ustr.gov/ambassador-
schwab-announces-us-will-seek-new-trade-agreement-fight-fakes [https
://perma.cc/W6FG-GJKB] (noting the goal of ACTA is "to set a new,
higher benchmark for enforcement").
106 Jeffery Atik, ACTA and the Destabilization of TRIPS, in
SUSTAINABLE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: A GUIDE TO GLOBAL AID &
TRADE DEVELOPMENT 121, 145 (Hans Henrik Lidgard et al. eds.,
2012); see also Yu, Achilles' Heel, supra note 19, at 513 ("To a great
extent, the ACTA negotiations make salient the TRIPS Agreement's
failure to meet the enforcement needs of developed countries, which
already existed before the beginning of the Uruguay Round.").
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products.1 0 7 As noted by Jayshree Watal, a former TRIPS
negotiator for India who recently retired from the WTO
Intellectual Property, Government Procurement and
Competition Division, the protection of undisclosed
information "ha[d] never been the subject of any
multilateral agreement" until the adoption of the TRIPS
Agreement.'o Despite the TRIPS negotiators' pioneering
efforts to multilateralize standards for such protection,
WTO members remain deeply divided as to how much
additional protection they need to provide after fulfilling
the two basic obligations of Article 39.3-that is, the
protection against unfair commercial use and the protection
against disclosure.109  That test data protection has
remained highly controversial in bilateral, regional, and
plurilateral trade negotiations strongly indicates the TRIPS
Agreement's ineffectiveness in harmonizing national
standards in this area.' o
Indeed, because of the Agreement's limited
harmonizing ability, whether a country will introduce new
107 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 39.3 (offering such
protection).
.o. JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 4 (2001).
109 See Yu, supra note 32, at 654-68 (discussing the various areas in
which the TRIPS language remains highly contested and in which the
TRIPS negotiating parties eventually failed to achieve any international
consensus); see also Peter K. Yu, Data Exclusivities in the Age ofBig
Data, Biologics, and Plurilaterals, 6 TEx. A&M L. REV. ARGUENDO
22, 23-26 (2018) (noting the five concerns policymakers and
commentators in, or sympathetic to, developing countries have over the
interpretation or implementation of Article 39.3 of the TRIPS
Agreement).
110 See Yu, supra note 32, at 672-85 (discussing the use of TRIPS-plus
bilateral, regional, and plurilateral negotiations to develop new
international minimum standards for the protection of undisclosed test
or other data for pharmaceutical, agrochemical, and biological
products).
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standards that align with those of developed countries often
depends on economic power and ideological persuasion."n
Thus far, the results have been quite inconsistent. For
instance, thanks to the United States' aggressive push for
higher intellectual property standards through the Section
301 process,112 emerging countries have introduced
standards that mirror those of the United States.113 By
... As Carolyn Deere Birkbeck observed:
Economic power was used where players deliberately deployed their
material resources and capacities to manipulate the strategic and
economic constraints of other countries, to push them to do something
that they would not otherwise do, or to compel them to desist from a
particular action ... Ideational power was also at play. Each team used
the power of ideas to advance distinctive perspectives on the pros and
cons of different approaches to TRIPS implementation, to dominate the
political environment for [intellectual property] reforms, to influence
the terms of debate in international negotiations, and to shape how
developing countries behaved at the national level. Ideational power
operated through efforts to influence expertise, know-how, and
institutional capabilities on [intellectual property] matters in developing
countries, as well as understandings, beliefs, and discourses about
[intellectual property].
DEERE, supra note 15, at 19 (footnotes omitted).
112 Section 301 permits the U.S. President to investigate and impose
sanctions on countries engaging in unfair trade practices that hreaten
the United States' economic interests. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420
(2018). See generally PETER DRAHOS WITH JOHN BRAITHWAITE,
INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY?
85-107 (2002) (discussing the United States' use of the Section 301
process, the Generalized System of Preferences, and other measures to
push through intellectual property and trade demands); Joe Karaganis
& Sean Flynn, Networked Governance and the USTR, in MEDIA
PIRACY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES 75 (Joe Karaganis ed., 2011)
(critically evaluating the USTR's Section 301 process); Paul C.B. Liu,
U.S. Industry's Influence on Intellectual Property Negotiations and
Special 301 Actions, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 87 (1994) (discussing
the operation of the Section 301 process and its relation to U.S. trade
negotiations).
113 See generally Peter K. Yu, The Transplant and Transformation of
Intellectual Property Laws in China, in GOVERNANCE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA AND EUROPE 20 (Nari Lee
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contrast, African countries have yet to face the same
amount of pressure from the United States, due in part to
the Executive Order that President Bill Clinton signed
following the pharmaceutical industry's disastrous
challenge to the Medicines and Related Substances Control
Amendment Act, 1997 in South Africa.1 14  Since that
Executive Order, the U.S. administration has not put any
African country on the Section 301 watch list or priority
watch list.11 5  Thus, when the experiences of these two
groups of countries are juxtaposed against each other, they
et al. eds., 2016) (providing a history of the transplant of intellectual
property laws in China and discussing the strengths, weaknesses, and
future of such efforts); Assafa Endeshaw, The Paradox of Intellectual
Property Lawmaking in the New Millennium: Universal Templates as
Terms of Surrender for Non-Industrial Nations; Piracy as an Offshoot,
10 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 47 (2002) (criticizing the application
of universal templates to non-industrial nations).
"' Exec. Order No. 13,155, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,521 (May 12, 2000)
(enabling countries in sub-Saharan Africa to enhance access to
HIV/AIDS medicines and related medical technologies without fear of
trade retaliation); see also SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC
LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 151-
55 (2003) (discussing the pharmaceutical industry's legal challenge and
the Executive Order).
115 See DEERE, supra note 15, at 306 ("[N]o African [least developed
country] has ever been cited on the US Special 301 list or subject to a
WTO dispute."); Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and Asian Values,
16 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 329, 380 (2012) (listing the USTR's
lack of Special 301 actions on South Africa from 2001 to 2011).
Nevertheless, the U.S. International Trade Commission recently
"launched an investigation to examine U.S. trade in goods and services
and investment in Sub-Saharan Africa." Press Release, U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n, USITC to Study U.S. Trade and Investment in Sub-Saharan
Africa (June 14, 2019), https://www.usitc.gov/pressroom/newsrel
ease/2019/er0614111115.htm [https://perma.cc/EZZ9-QLKV]. Among
other objectives, the study will "describe the intellectual property
environment in key [Sub-Saharan African] markets including national
and regional laws, enforcement measures, and infringement issues as
well as the effects of this environment on trade and investment in these
markets." Id.
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show that TRIPS standards have been largely transplanted
through geopolitical, economic, or ideational power, as
opposed to the Agreement's harmonizing ability.
E. Developing Countries Have Improved
The final explanation is that many developing
countries have greatly improved since the adoption of the
TRIPS Agreement. Although they considerably struggled
in the first decade of the WTO, many developing countries,
especially emerging ones, have now successfully adjusted
to the TRIPS-based international intellectual property
regime.116 Some countries have even managed to secure
benefits from that regime.1 17  As WTO Director-General
Roberto Azev6do recalled:
116 See generally Peter K. Yu, The Middle Intellectual Property
Powers, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT OF MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES:
AVOIDING THE MIDDLE-INCOME TRAP 84 (Randall Peerenboom & Tom
Ginsburg eds., 2014) (discussing the changing international intellectual
property landscape caused by the rise of emerging countries).
117 As A.V. Ganesan, a former chief negotiator for India during the
Uruguay Round and a former chair of the WTO Appellate Body,
observed in the Indian context:
[T]he TRIPS Agreement has almost become a blessing in disguise for
India. Having become a signatory to it, and having a good track record
of abiding by international agreements it has entered into, India can
now confidently assure foreign investors and technology suppliers that
their IPRs will be protected in accordance with internationally accepted
standards as embodied in the TRIPS Agreement. The TRIPS
Agreement can also help India avoid unnecessary trade frictions with
other countries by suggesting that a grievance over protection of
[intellectual property] can be resolved through the dispute settlement
mechanism of the WTO. Given the size of the Indian domestic market,
and its projected growth rates, such an assurance of protection of IPRs
(in addition to other supportive policies) may well encourage foreign
investors to establish manufacturing facilities in India through
subsidiaries and joint ventures or to license their technologies to
domestic manufacturers.
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[I]n 1995, and earlier in the negotiations
leading to the conclusion of TRIPS, the
international [intellectual property] system
was largely seen as a trade interest of the
developed economies. Today, the picture
differs dramatically. Some middle-income
countries are among the major users of the
global [intellectual property] system, and
many other developing countries are
increasingly engaged with it.' 18
Out of these middle-income countries, China
provides the most dramatic example, due to its struggle
before and immediately after WTO accession in December
2001119 and the fact that it "has [now] built a new
intellectual property system from the ground up faster than
any other country in history."120 Today, China has slowly
Ganesan, supra note 66, at 232; see also Yu, RCEP and Trans-Pacific
Norms, supra note 83, at 722 (noting that "China, India, and other
emerging countries within ASEAN+6 ... have begun to appreciate the
strategic benefits of stronger intellectual property protection and
enforcement").
118 Roberto Azevido, Foreword to MAKING OF TRIPS AGREEMENT,
supra note 9, at xiii.
119 See generally Peter K. Yu, The First Decade of TRIPS in China, in
CHINA AND GLOBAL TRADE GOVERNANCE: CHINA'S FIRST DECADE IN
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 126 (Zeng Ka & Liang Wei eds.,
2013) (reviewing the intellectual property developments in China in its
first decade of the WTO membership); Yu, supra note 71, at 1064-79
(discussing China's preparation to join the WTO and its eventual
integration into the TRIPS-based international intellectual property
regime).
120 Peter K. Yu, Trade Secret Hacking, Online Data Breaches, and
China's Cyberthreats, 2015 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 130, 139; see
also Peter K. Yu, Building the Ladder: Three Decades of Development
of the Chinese Patent System, 5 WIPO J. 1, 2 (2013) ("China ... has
accomplished what no other country has ever achieved in such a short
period of time-be it Germany, Japan or the United States. While it
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emerged as an innovative power.121 Based on the latest
WIPO statistics, in 2018 China stood behind only the
United States in terms of the number of international
applications under the Patent Cooperation Treaty.122 In
addition, Huawei Technologies, ZTE Corporation, and
BOE Technology Group-all Chinese companies-ranked
among the world's top ten corporate applicants.123 For the
same year, China also ranked third in the number of
took the now-developed countries centuries to establish their patent
systems, the same feat took China only three decades.").
121 See JOHN L. ORCUTT & SHEN HONG, SHAPING CHINA'S INNOVATION
FUTURE: UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN TRANSITION ix
(2011) (noting the many notable achievements China has made in space
technology, biotechnology (including genomics and stem cell research),
information technology, nanotechnology, and advanced energy
technology); SHAUN REIN, THE END OF COPYCAT CHINA: THE RISE OF
CREATIVITY, INNOVATION, AND INDIVIDUALISM IN ASIA xv (2014)
("Chinese companies no longer just copycat business models from
America and Europe. They still grab low-hanging fruit but focus more
on innovation."); Richard P. Suttmeier & Yao Xiangkui, China 's IP
Transition: Rethinking Intellectual Property Rights in a Rising China
6-7 (Nat'l Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Special Report No. 29,
2011) ("China is ... poised for an [intellectual property] transition. Yet
whether this transition will lead to greater harmonization with
international [intellectual property] norms and practices, toward
'destroying the [intellectual property] regime' . . . , or to some other
departure from the given order remains unclear."); Peter K. Yu, The
Rise and Decline of the Intellectual Property Powers, 34 CAMPBELL L.
REV. 525, 529-32 (2012) (noting that China is at the cusp of crossing
over from a pirate nation to a country respectful of intellectual property
rights). See generally DENIS FRED SIMON & CAO CONG, CHINA'S
EMERGING TECHNOLOGICAL EDGE: ASSESSING THE ROLE OF HIGH-END
TALENT (2009) (examining the rapid expansion of China's science and
technology capabilities, focusing in particular on the contributions
provided by an increasingly large and well-educated talent pool).
122 Who Filed the Most PCT Patent Applications in 2018?, WORLD
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international trademark applications under the Madrid
Agreement Concerning the International Registration of
Marks and its related protocol.12 4
At the domestic level, the total number of patent
applications has been equally impressive. According to the
National Intellectual Property Administration of China
(CNIPA), China processed over 4.3 million patent
applications in 2018, with over 4.1 million originating in
domestic applicants.12 5 While these figures included three
types of patents-those for inventions, designs, and utility
models-the total number of invention patents issued in
China in 2018 (432,147) compared favorably with the total
number of utility patents issued in the United States in the
same year (306,909).126
To be sure, questions have arisen over the quality of
patents issued by CNIPA and its predecessor, the State
Intellectual Property Office.12 7 Nevertheless, Chinese firms
124 Who Filed the Most Madrid Trademark Applications in 2018?,
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.wipo.int/
export/sites/www/ipstats/en/docs/infographic_madrid_2018.pdf [https
://perma.cc/KTR3-GTED] (last visited June 23, 2019).
125 Total Applications/Grants/In Force for Three Kinds of Patents
Received from Home and Abroad, NAT'L INTELL. PROP. ADMIN. CHINA,
http://www.cnipa.gov.cn/tjxx/jianbao/year2018/a/al.html (last visited
Aug. 4, 2019).
126 Compare Distribution of Annual Grants for Three Kinds of Patents
Received from Home and Abroad, NAT'L INTELL. PROP. ADMIN. CHINA,
http://www.cnipa.gov.cn/tjxx/jianbao/year2018/b/bl.html [https://penn
a.cc/5L7A-FYCJ] (last visited Aug. 4, 2019), with U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, FY 2018 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT 178 (2018) [hereinafter 2018 USPTO REPORT].
127 As Dan Prud'homme observed:
While patents are exploding in China and certain innovation is also on
the rise, patent quality has not proportionately kept up and in fact the
overall strength of China's actual innovation appears overhyped.
Statistical analysis . . . not only reveals concerning trends in the quality
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have been actively applying for and obtaining patents at
both the European Patent Office and the United States
Patent and Trademark Office. Based on the 2017 statistics
concerning patent applications filed in the United States,
residents from mainland China (32,127) were behind only
those of Japan (89,364), South Korea (38,026), and
Germany (32,771).128 According to the European Patent
Office, about sixteen percent of its patent filings in that
same year originated in China, which trailed behind only
the United States and Japan.129
As if these statistics were not impressive enough,
China ranks fourteenth in the 2019 Global Innovation
Index,1 3 0 having moved up from seventeenth in 2018,
twenty-second in 2017, and twenty-fifth in 2016.131 As the
of China's patents at present, but suggests that while patent filings in
China will likely continue to notably grow in the future, patent quality
may continue to lag these numbers.
DAN PRUD'HOMME, DULLING THE CUTTING-EDGE: How PATENT-
RELATED POLICIES AND PRACTICES HAMPER INNOVATION IN CHINA 1
(2012) (emphasis omitted). See generally Mark Liang, Chinese Patent
Quality: Running the Numbers and Possible Remedies, 11 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 478 (2012) (questioning the quality
of Chinese patents and offering suggestions for reform).
128 2018 USPTO REPORT, supra note 126, at 184-85.
129 European Patent Filings per Country of Origin, EUROPEAN PATENT
OFFICE (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.epo.org/about-us/annual-reports-
statistics/annual-report/2017/statistics/patent-filings.html#tab3 [https://
perma.cc/27Y7-UAQP].
130 Rankings, in GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX 2019: CREATING
HEALTHY LIVES-THE FUTURE OF MEDICAL INNOVATION xxxiv
(Soumitra Dutta et al. eds., 2019) [hereinafter GLOBAL INNOVATION
INDEX 2019], https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipopubgii
2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/BY76-VBWW].
131 Rankings, in GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX 2018: ENERGIZING THE
WORLD WITH INNOVATION xx (Soumitra Dutta et al. eds., 2018),
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipopubgii_2 0 1 8.pdf [https
://perma.cc/J76G-U2M7]; Rankings, in GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX
2017: INNOVATION FEEDING THE WORLD xviii (Soumitra Dutta et al.
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2019 report stated, "China continues its upward rise ... and
firmly establishes itself as one of the innovation leaders."13 2
The country "was [also] responsible for 24% of the world's
[research-and-development] expenditures in 2017, up from
only 2.6% in 1996."133
Although China is arguably in a league of its own,
many other emerging countries have greatly benefited from
the TRIPS-based international intellectual property
regime. 134 A few years ago, I conducted a study of what I
called the "middle intellectual property powers."135 This
study focused on the ten largest economies outside the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) that had a gross national income (GNI) per capita
of less than fifteen thousand U.S. dollars but some of the
world's highest volumes of high-tech exports.136 In
addition to the five BRICS countries,13 7 which have
eds., 2017), https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipopubgii
2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/D64H-9FVV]; Rankings, in GLOBAL
INNOVATION INDEX 2016: WINNING WITH GLOBAL INNOVATION xviii
(Soumitra Dutta et al. eds., 2016), https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/
en/wipopubgii_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/L268-9ZQ7].
132 Soumitra Dutta et al., The Global Innovation Index 2019, in GLOBAL
INNOVATION INDEX 2019, supra note 130, at 1, 9.
133Id. at 3.
134 Another widely cited example is India. See Ganesan, supra note 66,
at 232 (discussing the TRIPS Agreement's benefits to India).
135 Yu, supra note 116.
136 Id. at 89-91.
137 The BRICS countries include Brazil, Russia, India, China, and
South Africa. See generally BRICS AND DEVELOPMENT ALTERN-
ATIVES: INNOVATION SYSTEMS AND POLICIES (Jos6 Eduardo Cassiolato
& Virginia Vitorino eds., 2009); ANDREW F. COOPER, THE BRICS: A
VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION (2016); AMRITA NARLIKAR, NEW
POWERS: HOW TO BECOME ONE AND HOW TO MANAGE THEM (2010);
JIM O'NEILL, THE GROWTH MAP: ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY IN THE
BRICS AND BEYOND (2011); THE BRICS-LAWYERS' GUIDE TO
GLOBAL COOPERATION (Rostam J. Neuwirth et al. eds., 2017)
[hereinafter BRICS-LAWYERS' GUIDE].
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received considerable attention from policymakers and
commentators, the selected countries included Argentina,
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. All of
these countries ranked within the top eighty-five in the
world in the 2019 Global Innovation Index, with Malaysia
and Thailand at thirty-fifth and forty-seventh
respectively. 138 Apart from these countries, Vietnam, a
fast-growing country with the world's fifteenth largest
population, also earned its top fifty spot, placing at forty-
second. 139
To some extent, the significant economic and
technological progress these countries have made explains
why they are increasingly willing to sign on to new TRIPS-
plus bilateral, regional, or plurilateral agreements. It also
shows why the draft RCEP intellectual property chapter
included much higher standards than what the TRIPS
Agreement requires, even though China and India have
been dominant players in the RCEP negotiations.1 40
138 Rankings, supra note 130, at xxxiv-xxxv.
139 Id.
140 See Yu, RCEP and Trans-Pacific Norms, supra note 83, at 737-40
(explaining why the RCEP negotiating parties may accept higher
intellectual property standards); see also Sonia E. Rolland, Developing
Country Coalitions at the WTO: In Search of Legal Support, 48 HARv.
INT'L L.J. 483, 536 (2007) (noting that those "medium-income
developing countries [that] have gained relatively more than their
poorer counterparts from the multilateral trade process have
increasingly found themselves adopting positions divergent from those
of [their counterparts] on the question of preferential access to rich
country markets"); Peter K. Yu, China 's Innovative Turn and the
Changing Pharmaceutical Landscape, 51 U. PAC. L. REv. (forthcoming
2020) (discussing how the proposed amendments to Chinese patent law
and pharmaceutical regulations would move China's position close to
that of developed countries); Yu, Copyright Norm-setting, supra note
83, at 40 ("[T]he technological rise of China, India and other emerging
countries in the Asian Pacific region in the past decade has called for a
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III. SELECT OBSERVATIONS
The previous Part explains why developing
countries have slowly changed their perception and
assessment of the TRIPS Agreement. This Part draws
observations from the Agreement's developments in the
past twenty-five years. These observations not only
provide the contexts needed to evaluate the five
explanations offered earlier, but also remind us why it is
unsurprising for countries to change their views on
international intellectual property agreements. These
observations also offer insight into the ongoing and future
development of the TRIPS Agreement and the larger
international intellectual property regime.
A. Pendulum Swings
The first observation concerns the pendulum swings
that are at play in the international intellectual property
regime, which commentators have pointed out in the
past. For instance, Ruth Okediji alluded to the
"pendulum swings in international intellectual property
protection" in a symposium on comparative intellectual
property and cyberlaw at the Faculty of Law of the
University of Ottawa.142 In a book chapter published in
The SAGE Handbook of Intellectual Property, I observed:
"[I]nternational intellectual property developments are
pause to rethink appropriate intellectual property nonn-setting
strategies.").
141 See, e.g., Marianne Levin, The Pendulum Keeps Swinging Present
Discussions on and Around the TRIPS Agreement, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN A FAIR WORLD TRADE SYSTEM: PROPOSALS FOR
REFORM OF TRIPS 3 (Annette Kur & Marianne Levin eds., 2011)
(using "pendulum swings" in the title); Ruth L. Okediji, Back to
Bilateralism? Pendulum Swings in International Intellectual Property
Protection, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 127 (2004) (same).
142 Okediji, supra note 141.
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influenced by the repeated swings of an invisible
pendulum. As this pendulum swings back and forth, history
will repeat itself, causing us to feel like it is deja vu all over
again."143
To a large extent, these pendulum swings explain
how the position of WTO members-including those in the
developing world-have swung back and forth over the
years and will continue to do so in the future. Taking a step
back to observe these swings over a long period of time
will also help locate instructive parallels that enrich our
understanding of the international intellectual property
regime.
At the time of writing, this regime has already seen
many recurring activities. For example, when developing
countries pushed hard to establish the Development
Agenda at WIPO in the mid-2000s,144 one could recall a
similar agenda in the 1960s and 1970s.1 4 ' The Old
143 Peter K. Yu, Dija Vu in the International Intellectual Property
Regime, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 113
(Matthew David & Debora Halbert eds., 2015).
144 See World Intellectual Prop. Org., Proposal by Argentina and Brazil
for the Establishment of a Development Agenda for WIPO, WIPO Doc.
WO/GA/3 1/11 (Aug. 27, 2004) (advancing the proposal for the WIPO
Development Agenda); Press Release, World Intellectual Prop. Org.,
Member States Adopt a Development Agenda for WIPO (Oct. 1, 2007),
https://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2007/article_0071.html [htt
ps://perma.cc/MF48-MGAG] (announcing the adoption of this
Agenda). For discussions of the WIPO Development Agenda, see
generally IMPLEMENTING THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ORGANIZATION'S DEVELOPMENT AGENDA (Jeremy de Beer ed., 2009)
[hereinafter IMPLEMENTING WIPO DEVELOPMENT AGENDA]; THE
DEVELOPMENT AGENDA: GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Neil Weinstock Netanel ed., 2008)
[hereinafter DEVELOPMENT AGENDA]; Yu, supra note 70, at 515-22.
145 See Yu, supra note 70, at 468-511 (discussing the Old Development
Agenda). This earlier agenda included "(1) the drafting of the
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Development Agenda actually paved the way for the
formation of WIPO as a U.N. specialized agency.14 6
Likewise, the past two decades of development of TRIPS-
plus bilateral, regional, and plurilateral agreements remind
us of the negotiations for bilateral treaties before the
adoption of the Paris and Berne Conventions."7 Professor
Okediji even traced the bilateral and regional agreements in
the mid-2000s back to the United States' "friendship,
commerce and navigation" treaties in the nineteenth
century and the first half of the twentieth century. As if
these resemblances were not remarkable enough, there are
strong historical parallels between the ACTA negotiations
and the push for an anti-counterfeiting code towards the
end of the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, between the "common heritage of
humankind" concept advanced in the late 1960s and
today's free software, open source, free culture, and access
to knowledge movements, and between the early
Stockholm Protocol, (2) the formation of WIPO as a specialized agency
of the United Nations, (3) the establishment of the International Code
of Conduct, and (4) the revision of the Paris Convention." Id. at 471.
146 See id. at 484-93 (discussing the formation of WIPO as a U.N.
specialized agency).
147 See Yu, supra note 143, at 117-21 (noting the similarities between
recent bilateral, regional, and plurilateral agreements and older
agreements of the same type). Similarly, Bryan Mercurio declared in
the trade context:
By the mid-1800s, ... trading nations had created a complex web of
agreements in which [most-favored-nation and national treatments]
applied bilaterally. When the "spaghetti bowl" agreements became
unmanageable, practitioners and government[s] realized the rights
needed to be formally adopted in an international framework. Such
efforts built upon the bilateralism by filling gaps and providing
coherence to [intellectual property rights]. This process culminated in
the Paris Convention ... and the Berne Convention.
Bryan Mercurio, TRIPS-Plus Provisions in FTAs: Recent Trends, in
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 215,
217 (Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino eds., 2007).
148 See Okediji, supra note 141, at 130-3 1.
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transplants of intellectual property laws during the colonial
era and the much more recent transplants through the
TRIPS Agreement and TRIPS-plus trade, investment, and
- 149intellectual property agreements.
All of these similarities not only place the earlier
explanations in the proper context, but they also explain
why the developing countries' position shift is not unusual.
Although this Article focuses primarily on developed
countries, these parallels will inform the developed
countries' position shift as well.1 50  Moreover, if the
parallels listed in this Section provide any predictive value,
the positions of developed and developing countries may
swap once again in the near future. Only time will tell
whether developing countries will switch their position
again and when and why they will do so. Should that
switch happen, this Article will need a redux treatment, the
same way the 2006 article did.
B. Action and Reaction
The second observation relates to the paired
opposite of action and reaction, made memorable by
Newton's Third Law of Motion.15 1  Translated into the
intellectual property context, any action in intellectual
property norm-setting, such as a push to adopt new TRIPS-
plus standards, can result in corresponding reactions in the
149 Yu, supra note 143, at 124-25 (citations omitted).
150 See supra text accompanying note 19 (noting the developed
countries' position shift).
151 Sir Isaac Newton's three laws of motion were first propounded in
Philosophite Naturalis Principia Mathematica, published in Latin in
1687. His third law of motion is usually reduced to the following: "For
every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction." Rhett Allain, A
Closer Look at Newton's Third Law, WIRED (Oct. 3, 2013),
https://www.wired.com/2013/10/a-closer-look-at-newtons-third-law [ht
tps://perma.cc/W4RL-JJ9M].
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political arena-whether domestic or global. These
dynamics have played out in the developing countries'
engagement with the TRIPS Agreement and the larger
- - 152international intellectual property regime.
In the mid-1990s, shortly after the adoption of the
TRIPS Agreement and when the Internet started to enter
the mainstream, James Boyle made a pioneering call for the
creation of "a politics of intellectual property." 15 3 As he
observed:
A successful political movement needs a set
of (popularizable) analytical tools which
reveal common interests around which
political coalitions can be built. Just as "the
environment" literally disappeared as a
concept in the analytical structure of private
property claims, simplistic "cause and
effect" science, and markets characterized
by negative externalities, so too the "public
domain" is disappearing, both conceptually
and literally, in an intellectual property
system built around the interests of the
current stakeholders and the notion of the
original author. In one very real sense, the
environmental movement invented the
152 For discussions of intellectual property politics, see generally
SEBASTIAN HAUNSS, CONFLICTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY: THE
CONTENTIOUS POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2015); POLITICS
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CONTESTATION OVER THE OWNERSHIP,
USE, AND CONTROL OF KNOWLEDGE AND INFORMATION (Sebastian
Haunss & Kenneth C. Shadlen eds., 2009) [hereinafter POLITICS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY]; KENNETH C. SHADLEN, COALITIONS AND
COMPLIANCE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PHARMACEUTICAL
PATENTS IN LATIN AMERICA (2017); 4 WIPO J. 1-138 (2011).
153 James Boyle, A Politics ofIntellectual Property: Environmentalism
for the Net?, 47 DUKE L.J. 87, 89 (1997).
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environment so that farmers, consumers,
hunters and birdwatchers could all discover
themselves as environmentalists. Perhaps
we need to invent the public domain in order
to call into being the coalition that might
protect it.1
Although intellectual property activism still has a
long way to go before it reaches the level of activism in the
environmental arena, the former has gone a long way and
has shown some promising developments in the past two
decades. 155
As far as political reactions to the active push for
stronger international intellectual property standards are
concerned, there is no better example than the adoption of
the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health in November 2001.156 Paragraph 6 of this
declaration "recognized that WTO Members with
insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the
pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making
154 Id. at 113.
155 As Amy Kapczynski noted rhetorically:
Who would have thought, a decade or two ago, that college students
would speak of the need to change copyright law with "something like
the reverence that earlier generations displayed in talking about social
or racial equality"? Or that advocates of "farmers' rights" could
mobilize hundreds of thousands of people to protest seed patents and an
[intellectual property] treaty? Or that AIDS activists would engage in
civil disobedience to challenge patents on medicines? Or that
programmers would descend upon the European Parliament to protest
software patents?
Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New
Politics ofIntellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 262, 263
(2008) (footnotes omitted).
156 World Trade Org., Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41
I.L.M. 746 (2002).
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effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS
Agreement."15 7 Pursuant o this paragraph, the Council for
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
adopted the Decision on the Implementation of Paragraph 6
of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health on August 30, 2003.158 This decision
eventually led to the adoption of the new Article 31bis of
the TRIPS Agreement. 159 Although it took more than a
decade for two-thirds of the WTO membership to ratify the
amendment protocol, the provision finally took effect in
January 2017.160
The Doha Declaration and the related developments
are particularly relevant o our discussion of the developing
countries' changing view on the TRIPS Agreement. As
WTO Director-General Roberto Azev6do observed, "The
adoption of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement
and Public Health in 2001, and [the TRIPS Agreement's]
subsequent amendment, encouraged th[e] shift in
perceptions" that the international intellectual property
system was set up mostly for developed economies.16 1
Likewise, Pedro Roffe made the observation that the
satisfactory conclusion of the Doha Declaration would
157 Id. ¶6.
158 General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Decision of
30 August 2003, WTO Doc. WT/L/540, 43 I.L.M. 509 (2004)
[hereinafter August 30 Decision].
159 See General Council, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WTO
Doc. WT/L/641 (Dec. 8, 2005), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
tripse/wtl641_e.htm [https://perma.cc/9PA3-CZV4] (providing the
protocol to amend the TRIPS Agreement).
160 Press Release, World Trade Org., WTO IP Rules Amended to Ease
Poor Countries' Access to Affordable Medicines (Jan. 23, 2017),
https://www.wto.org/english/newse/newsl7_e/trip_23janl7_e.htm [htt
ps://perma.cc/A36S-PWR7].
161 Azevido, supra note 118, at xiii.
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cause developing countries "to see the TRIPS Agreement
as an important tool to constrain developed country
behavior."16 2
Similar action-reaction dynamics can be found at
the domestic level. The past decade, for instance, has seen
two sets of strong political reactions in the intellectual
property arena, which occurred close in time. The first set
of reactions concerned the resistance to the development of
new and higher enforcement standards under ACTA.163 To
counteract the secretive process used to develop these
standards and to highlight the danger of their potential
erosion of online freedoms and other civil liberties,
commentators, nongovernmental organizations, and
individual volunteers filled the Internet with leaked
negotiation texts, widespread online coverage of these draft
texts, and updates on the latest negotiation rounds.1 6 4 The
European Union's effort to adopt the Agreement also led to
massive street protests throughout Europe in the middle of
162 Abbott, supra note 10, at 22.
163 ACTA, supra note 29.
164 As I observed in an earlier article:
While disclosure of official information remained sparse at his stage of
negotiations, civil liberties groups had been active in providing
information to help the public understand the agreement's potential
impact. For example, in March 2008, more than a couple of months
before the first round of negotiations, IP Justice published a pioneering
and very informative white paper discussing the potential negotiation
items on ACTA. Academics and civil liberties groups across the world
also worked hard to obtain information through [the Freedom of
Information Act], the Canadian Access to Information Act, or their
equivalents. Many of them even managed to obtain "leaked"
information or documents, which were quickly posted onto the Internet
via WikiLeaks and other websites. In addition, commentators-most
notably Professor [Michael] Geist-offered concise yet valuable
commentary on the potential provisions while keeping the public up-to-
date about the state of the negotiations.
Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 29, at 1016-17 (footnotes omitted).
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winter-in major cities such as Amsterdam, Berlin,
Copenhagen, Krakow, Munich, Paris, Prague, Sofia,
Stockholm, and Vienna.1 6 5  In addition, "a petition of 2
million signatures was handed in to the European
Parliament, and thousands of emails were sent to Members
of the European Parliament."1 6 6  These protests and
signatures eventually led to the European Parliament's
resounding rejection of ACTA in June 2012. 16 Thus,
despite the adoption of this initially ambitious Agreement
in April 2011, that Agreement has been ratified by only a
single country-Japan, the country of depositary.16 8
The second set of political reactions involved the
resistance to the development of new and higher
intellectual property enforcement standards under the
PROTECT IP Actl6 and the Stop Online Piracy Act.1 70
Providing an American parallel to the ACTA protests in
Europe, this resistance eventually led to an unprecedented,
165 See MONICA HORTEN, A COPYRIGHT MASQUERADE: How
CORPORATE LOBBYING THREATENS ONLINE FREEDOMS 107-14 (2013)
(discussing these protests).
166 Id. at 115.
167 Id. at 127; see also Monika Ennert, Unprecedented Vote: EU
Parliament Trade Committee Rejects ACTA, INTELL. PROP. WATCH
(June 21, 2012), http://www.ip-watch.org/2012/06/21/unprecedented-
vote-eu-parliament-trade-committee-rej cts-acta [https://penna.cc/9D7
E-EW2M] (noting that the rejection of ACTA marked the first time the
Committee on International Trade of the European Parliament struck
down a trade agreement).
168 See ACTA, supra note 29, art. 45 ("The Government of Japan shall
be the Depositary of this Agreement."); see also Maira Sutton, Japan
Was the First to Ratify ACTA. Will They Join TPP Next?, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 26, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/
10/japan-ratify-acta-will-they-join-tpp-next [https://penna.cc/F5EJ-KD
2H] (reporting Japan's ratification).
169 Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of
Intellectual Property Act of 2011 (PIPA), S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011).
170 Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011).
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massive service blackout launched by Wikipedia, Reddit,
WordPress, and other Internet companies.171 This blackout,
in turn, caused Congressional leaders to quickly withdraw
support for the two controversial bills. 17 2 As Senator Ron
Wyden succinctly summarized in his reminder to then
USTR Ronald Kirk in a Senate Finance Committee
hearing, "[t]he norm changed on Jan. 18, 2012, when
millions and millions of Americans said we will not accept
being locked out of debates about Internet freedom."1 7 3
Although these two sets of political reactions
remain rare in the intellectual property field, and we have
not seen similar resistance to other controversial
intellectual property standards in either the TPP or the
USMCA, these three examples show that an aggressive
push for high intellectual property standards could
sometimes result in political reactions that help fuel the
resistance to those standards. To some extent, the action-
reaction dynamics explain why developing countries were
able to secure greater support after the introduction of the
TRIPS Agreement. Those dynamics also help drive the
171 See Jonathan Weisman, In Fight Over Piracy Bills, New Economy
Rises Against Old, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 18, 2012, at Al (reporting the
blackout).
172 See Yu, Alphabet Soup, supra note 40, at 32-33 (noting the loss of
support for these bills). See generally EDWARD LEE, THE FIGHT FOR
THE FUTURE: How PEOPLE DEFEATED HOLLYWOOD AND SAVED THE
INTERNET-FOR Now 55-78 (2013) (discussing the blackout and its
aftermath).
173 Joseph J. Schatz, Technology Groups Worry About Trade Pact, CQ
TODAY ONLINE NEWS (Mar. 13, 2012),
http://public.cq.com/docs/news/news-000004045563.html
[https://perma.cc/HY6X-2HG6].
17' As I noted in an earlier article:
Since the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement, . . . civil society
organizations have become much more active in the intellectual
property arena. Indeed, many NGOs found themselves "woken up" by
the harsh realities the unbalanced TRIPS Agreement brought and the
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development of what Professor Halabi refers to as
public health crises the Agreement precipitated in the less developed
world. In retrospect, Sisule Musungu and Graham Dutfield considered
"civil society groups . . . the single most important factor in raising the
issue of the impact of the international intellectual property standards,
especially TRIPS standards, on development issues such as health, food
and agriculture." Andrea Menescal also observed that "the most
welcome news to emerge from the 2004 [WIPO Development Agenda]
debate is that developing countries' governments are no longer alone in
opposing an even further strengthening of the [intellectual property]
holders' rights and the prevalence of private interests in the [intellectual
property] field."
Yu, supra note 94, at 1639-40 (quotations omitted); see also DEERE,
supra note 15, at 134 ("The participation of NGOs [nongovernmental
organizations] in global debates on TRIPS began in the late stages of
the Uruguay Round. From 1993 to 1995, NGOs such as [Third World
Network], Health Action International (HAI), and GRAIN published
concerns about the implications of TRIPS for development, public
health, and farmers." (footnote omitted)); DUNCAN MATTHEWS,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT: THE
ROLE OF NGOs AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 26 (2011) ("Th[e] process of
[nongovernmental organization] engagement with the scope and
effective of in-built TRIPS flexibilities began soon after the TRIPS
Agreement came into force in 1995"); Keith E. Maskus, The WIPO
Development Agenda: A Cautionary Note, in DEVELOPMENT AGENDA,
supra note 144, at 163-64 ("Policymakers, non-governmental
organizations, the media, and even many legal scholars have awakened
to the fact that [intellectual property] regulations have rather
fundamental implications for the processes of economic
development."); SELL, supra note 114, at 181 ("When I asked some
public-regarding copyright activists 'where they had been' during
TRIPS, they told me they had been 'sleeping' but that because of
TRIPS they had 'woken up."'); Ellen 't Hoen, The Revised Drug
Strategy: Access to Essential Medicines, Intellectual Property, and the
World Health Organization, in ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 127, 131 (Gaelle Krikorian & Amy
Kapczynski eds., 2010) (stating that it was at the International
Conference on National Medicinal Drug Policies in Sydney in 1995
that "for the first time public-health advocates raised the concern that
the globalization of new international trade rules and the harmonization
of regulatory requirements would restrict countries' ability to
implement drug policies that would ensure access to medicine for all").
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"intellectual property shelters" in the areas of public health,
biological diversity, and food security. 175
Understanding the action-reaction dynamics in the
intellectual property arena is important because context is
always needed to develop a full understanding of laws and
policies. As Sebastian Haunss and Kenneth Shadlen
observed in the introduction to Politics of Intellectual
Property:
[W]hile laws are the solidified results of
social struggles and political conflicts,
understanding the law itself tells us little
about the social processes that lay behind
laws and even less about the social
dynamics that will eventually challenge and
often change them. Laws establish
opportunities for action, and strictly legal
perspectives in most cases say little about
different actors' motivations and capacities
to exploit these opportunities and how the
motivations and capacities change over
-176
time.
Moreover, the action-reaction dynamics remind us
of the importance of mobilization and resistance, 177 as well
175 See discussion Section I.C.
176 Sebastian Haunss & Kenneth C. Shadlen, Introduction: Rethinking
the Politics of Intellectual Property, in POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, supra note 152, at 1, 2.
177 See Susan Sell, Intellectual Property and Public Policy in Historical
Perspective: Contestation and Settlement, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 267,
321 (2004) ("Each new round of contestation and settlement produces
new winners and losers. History has shown that depending on how well
mobilized and badly threatened the losers are, they can rise up to
challenge the settlement."); Yu, supra note 143, at 125 ("[W]hether
reforms will succeed will ultimately depend on whether the relevant
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as the strong "resilience of local interests." As Ruth
Okediji observed when the TRIPS Agreement reached its
adult age, "[a]t a minimum, twenty-one years of TRIPS
should have taught the global community that national
welfare considerations will inevitably resist, and legal
innovation will invariably emerge, to counter the
imprudence of a treaty that attempts to subvert the very
territorial and self-seeking national ends for which IP law
exists." 179
C. Selective Adaptation
The third observation pertains to the compromises
developing countries have struck in response to the external
pressure exerted by the European Union, the United States,
and other developed countries. Although commentators
often criticized the TRIPS Agreement for transplanting
inappropriate legal standards in developing countries,18 o the
Agreement is filled with compromises and ambiguities,181
constituencies could sustainably mobilize to protect their gains while
challenging the undesirable status quo." (citations omitted)); Yu, supra
note 19, at 527-28 ("If the TRIPS Agreement is . . . a work in progress,
[developing] countries will have their opportunities. Whether they can
succeed ... will depend on whether they can rise up to the challenge of
pushing for the adoption of their preferred norms.").
178 See Okediji, supra note 27, at 199 (noting "the resilience of local
interests, sometimes working in concert with transnational actors, in
identifying those domestic considerations that could successfully blunt
the toughest edges of multilateral [intellectual property] obligations").
179 Id. at 267.
180 See supra note 113 (providing sources that have made similar
arguments).
181 See DINWOODIE & DREYFUSS, supra note 15, at 34-39 (discussing
the compromise narrative); Thu-Lang Tran Wasescha, Negotiating for
Switzerland, in MAKING OF TRIPS AGREEMENT, supra note 9, at 159,
165-66 ("I remember thinking that when no one was happy with the
result it must mean that the text is somewhere mid-way. The TRIPS
Agreement was a text no one was entirely happy with-this, in itself,
could be an achievement."); WATAL, supra note 108, at 7 (advancing
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and many countries have declined to introduce the
developed countries' standards verbatim.1 8 2 istead, many
of these countries adopt compromising solutions or hybrid
standards that were mid-way between the demandeur
countries' standards and the developing countries' original
standards.1 8 3 Other than the usual political resistance, the
preferences for adopting these compromises can be
attributed to the effort to preserve the residual strengths of
the original standards, the mismatch between local
conditions and the new standards, and inertia on the part of
both policymakers and legislators.1 8 4
the concept of "constructive ambiguities"); Judd, supra note 52, at 531
("The TRIPS constituencies harbor too many opposing viewpoints for
the instrument to please everyone all the time."); Peter K. Yu, The
Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 Hous. L. REv.
979, 1022-23 (2009) (discussing the ambiguities within the TRIPS
Agreement).
182 See DINWOODIE & DREYFUSS, supra note 15, at 14 ("The BRICS ...
tend to see the TRIPS Agreement as providing them with a menu of
flexibilities. They are working within that understanding to enact what
they view as TRIPS-consistent laws, but laws that are different from
those of the main proponents of the Agreement." (footnote omitted));
SHADLEN, supra note 152, at 85 ("Although Argentina adopted a new
patent system as demanded by the WTO in the 1990s, the outcome
differs-in fundamentally key ways-from the desires of the
transnational pharmaceutical industry and US Government, as well as
from the initial desires of the Argentinean Executive.").
183 As Ruth Okediji observed:
[G]lobal friction over TRIPS implementation has not been focused on
whether compliant legislative changes have been adopted. Rather, the
friction is focused on the ways in which TRIPS flexibilities have been
utilized, be they in the governing statutes, in the courts or in
administrative agencies, which, as the following section suggests, are
poised to be the leading laboratories of legal innovation.
Okediji, supra note 27, at 230; see also Peter K. Yu, Fair Use and Its
Global Paradigm Evolution, 2019 U. ILL. L. REv. 111, 137-41
(discussing the introduction of hybrid transplants in the copyright
context).
184 See Yu, supra note 183, at 141-55 (explaining why policymakers
and legislators have preferred a paradigm evolution to a paradigm shift
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Indeed, as we have seen in both the TRIPS
negotiations and WTO panel decisions, splitting the middle
seems to be quite popular among those involved in the
international trading body. Although least developed
countries pushed hard for an extension of the TRIPS
transition period for fifteen years in the run-up to the Hong
Kong Ministerial, developed countries were reluctant to
offer such an extension. 185 The two sides eventually settled
on an extension for only seven and a half years, half of
what developing countries requested.18 6 Likewise, in the
first TRIPS dispute between China and the United States,
the panel found for China on the criminal threshold claim,
but held for the United States on the formalities claim, with
the claim on customs measures split between the two
parties. Because both sides had seemingly secured a 2-1
victory, neither side appealed the decision.188
when importing foreign laws and legal models from abroad); see also
SHADLEN, supra note 152, at 240-46 (noting the tension and
contradictory relationship between tailoring strategies that make the
patent regime compatible with local conditions and aspiring strategies
that facilitate growth into a new patent regime).
15 See Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, LDCs Agree to Shorter Extension for
TRIPS Implementation, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Nov. 29, 2005),
https://www.ip-watch.org/2005/11/29/ldcs-agree-to-shorter-extension-f
or-trips-implementation [https://penna.cc/983R-TBCB] ("[Least devel-
oped countries] collectively sought a 15-year extension but met with
opposition from developed countries and ultimately agreed to 7.5 years
in a 29 November meeting of the TRIPS Council.").186 LDC Extension Press Release, supra note 6.
17 Panel Report, China Measures Affecting the Protection and
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights ¶ 8.1, WTO Doc.
WT/DS362/R (adopted Jan. 26, 2009). For my discussions of this
dispute, see generally Peter K. Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute, 89
NEB. L. REv. 1046 (2011) [hereinafter Yu, TRIPS Enforcement
Dispute]; Peter K. Yu, TRIPS Enforcement and Developing Countries,
26 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 727 (2011).
.ss Yu, TRIPS Enforcement Dispute, supra note 187, at 1082.
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To some extent, the developing countries' active
push for compromising solutions and hybrid standards have
facilitated what commentators have termed "selective
adaptation."189 Seeking to "incorporat[e] ... only
beneficial features of the TRIPS Agreement without also
transplanting its harmful and unsuitable elements,"190 this
process explains in part why the Agreement has had limited
189 See Wu Handong, One Hundred Years of Progress: The
Development of the Intellectual Property System in China, 1 WIPO J.
117, 118-19 (2009) (discussing the stage of "selective arrangement in
light of domestic development"); Peter K. Yu, When the Chinese
Intellectual Property System Hits 35, 8 QUEEN MARY J. INTELL. PROP.
3, 12 (2018) ("[A]s China moved from the imitation and transplantation
phase to the indigenization and transformation phase, it has skilfully
deployed 'selective adaptation' strategies to ensure the incorporation of
only beneficial features of the TRIPS Agreement without also
transplanting its harmful and unsuitable elements."); see also Yu, supra
note 113, at 26 (noting the transformation of transplant could result in
"selective adaptation").
Amy Kapczynski advanced a similar concept, which she called
mimicry:
One such strategy . . . can be called mimicry, which I define as a
strategy of transformative copying. Here, "recipient" countries model
and legitimate their local law with reference to the law of "dominant"
countries. But rather than adopt wholesale the meanings of these
provisions, these texts are revised or reinscribed. Mimicry is legal
transplantation with a difference. Transplantation designates the simple
"moving of a rule of law or a system of law from one country to
another." It identifies a kind of mindless borrowing; "transplanted"
rules are typically not transformed when adopted, though they may
evolve once implemented. Mimicry, in contrast, is a dynamic
reworking cast as a sharing or borrowing.
Kapczynski, supra note 95, at 1636 (footnotes omitted).
190 Yu, supra note 189, at 12; see also Sunil Mani & Richard R.
Nelson, Conclusion, in TRIPS COMPLIANCE, NATIONAL PATENT
REGIMES AND INNOVATION: EVIDENCE AND EXPERIENCE FROM
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 222, 223 (Sunil Mani & Richard R. Nelson
eds., 2013) [hereinafter TRIPS COMPLIANCE] (stating that "India, and
to some extent Brazil and Thailand, "have used the TRIPS flexibilities
as a window of opportunity for reducing the deleterious effects of
TRIPS compliance on their domestic industry and indeed consumers").
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ability to harmonize national intellectual property
standards.191 As Pitman Potter described the process in the
Chinese context:
Applied to China, selective adaptation
analysis permits understanding of local
responses to international legal obligations.
China's interpretation and implementation
of international agreements in trade, such as
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) and agreements associated with the
... WTO . .. , for example, will depend on
the extent to which interpretive
communities-comprising government
officials, socio-economic and professional
elites, and other privileged groups exercising
authority borne of political and/or
professional position, specialized
knowledge, and/or socio-economic status-
assimilate norms of trade liberalization. 192
At its core, selective adaptation is a strategic
response that aims to avoid two evils. While developing
country members of the WTO are unlikely to have the
ability to fight off demands from the European Union, the
United States, or other powerful WTO members for higher
intellectual property standards, they are keenly aware of the
mismatch between the demanded standards and their needs,
interests, conditions, and priorities. To reduce the harm
these ill-advised transplants would inflict upon them, they
carefully pick their battles with developed countries and
191 See discussion supra Section I.D.
192 Pitman B. Potter, China and the International Legal System:
Challenges of Participation, in CHINA'S LEGAL SYSTEM: NEW
DEVELOPMENTS, NEW CHALLENGES 145, 147-48 (Donald C. Clarke
ed., 2008) (footnotes omitted).
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modify the transplanted standards as much as they can,
conscious of the latter's political pressure and the potential
repercussions.193
In doing so, developing countries selectively adapt
the developed countries' models and successfully retain
some of their own standards. Such selective adaptation
enables the former to undertake law and policy
194-
experiments while facilitating jurisdictional competition
193 The most obvious repercussion is the developed countries' use of
the WTO dispute settlement process to pressure developing countries to
make further changes to their laws. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note
2, art. 64 (mandating the use of the WTO dispute settlement process to
settle disputes arising under the TRIPS Agreement). See generally
DIsPuTE SETTLEMENT AT THE WTO: THE DEVELOPING COUNTRY
EXPERIENCE (Gregory C. Shaffer & Ricardo Melendex-Ortiz eds.,
2010) (documenting the developing countries' experiences at the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body); Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 18
(explaining the significance of linking the TRIPS Agreement to the
WTO dispute settlement process); Joost Pauwelyn, The Dog That
Barked but Didn't Bite: 15 Years of Intellectual Property Disputes at
the WTO, 1 J. INT'L DisP. SETTLEMENT 389 (2010) (providing an
analysis of the TRIPS disputes in the first fifteen years of the WTO);
Gregory Shaffer, Recognizing Public Goods in WTO Dispute
Settlement: Who Participates? Who Decides? The Case of TRIPS and
Pharmaceutical Patent Protection, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 459 (2004)
(discussing the WTO dispute settlement process in relation to the
TRIPS Agreement in the pharmaceutical context); Peter K. Yu, Are
Developing Countries Playing a Better TRIPS Game?, 16 UCLA J.
INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 311, 333-36 (2011) (discussing the
developing countries' performance in the TRIPS interpretation game
through the use of the WTO dispute settlement process).
194 As Professor Kapczynski noted in the Indian context:
In the process of interpreting the TRIPS Agreement, and in part
through the intervention of local industry and health advocates, India
introduced robust versions of familiar flexibilities such as compulsory
licensing, but also introduced some less common and even entirely new
flexibilities. Among those innovations are novel limitations on subject
matter, an exceptionally high inventive step standard, procedural
requirements that could substantially decrease the grant rate, a patent
misuse standard that may sharply constrain voluntary licensing activity,
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at the global level. 19 5 One of the most widely discussed
experiments in this area is the introduction of Section 3(d)
of the Indian Patents (Amendment) Act of 2005, which
prevents protection from being granted to the mere
discovery of a new form of a known substance which does
not result in increased efficacy of that substance or the
mere discovery of any new property or new use for a
known substance or of the mere use of a known process,
and perhaps most strikingly, limits on injunctive remedies. Rather than
rejecting TRIPS, India has entered fully into its terms.
Kapczynski, supra note 95, at 1589; see also Padmashree Gehl
Sampath & Pedro Roffe, The Technology Transfer Debates and the
Role ofEmerging Economies, in EMERGING MARKETS AND THE WORLD
PATENT ORDER 100, 102 (Frederick M. Abbott et al. eds., 2013)
(noting that the experience of a new group of developing countries,
such as Brazil, China, and India, "shows that numerous recipes exist to
promote sustainable industrial development, and the question of when
to grant [intellectual property rights] (at which stage) in the
development process i  often as important an issue as whether to grant
it and in what forms"); Okediji, supra note 27, at 230-48 (discussing
the role of legal innovation in shaping national development strategies
and domestic policy prerogatives in India, Brazil, and Malta); Yu,
supra note 193, at 324 ("India succeeded in delaying the introduction
of a new patent law for pharmaceutical products until after the
expiration of the transitional period."); Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note
29, at 1037 ("[G]reater harmonization of legal standards could take
away the valuable opportunities for experimentation with new
regulatory and economic policies."). See generally TRIPS
COMPLIANCE, supra note 190 (discussing the process through which
Brazil, India, Thailand, and China achieved compliance with the TRIPS
Agreement).
195 See Duffy, supra note 95, at 685, 706-07 (discussing how diversity
can promote jurisdictional competition); Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra
note 29, at 1037 ("The creation of diversified rules could . . . facilitate
competition among jurisdictions, thus rendering the lawmaking process
more accountable to the local populations by allowing them to decide
for themselves what rules and systems they want to adopt.").
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machine, or apparatus unless such process results in a new
product or employs at least one new reactant.196
The developing countries' effort to undertake policy
experiments can be highly beneficial.1 9 7  As Jerome
Reichman suggested, these countries may want to refrain
from following the developed countries' lead, and adopting
their intellectual property models; instead, the former
should consider taking the lead in the knowledge economy
by building their own comparative advantages.198 As he
observed:
196 The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 15 of 2005, § 3(d), INDIA CODE
(2005); see also Kapczynski, supra note 95, at 1590-98 (discussing
Section 3(d) of the Indian Patents (Amendment) Act of 2005).
197 See 1 LADAS, supra note 16, at 9-16 (discussing the "laboratory
effects" of legal innovation); Cho, supra note 24, at 238 (discussing the
"laboratory effect" of regionalism, which allows countries to
experience trial and error and learning-by-doing at the regional level);
Duffy, supra note 95, at 707-08 (discussing how countries can develop
legal systems by experimenting with new regulatory and economic
policies through inter-jurisdictional competition); Rupprecht Podszun
& Benjamin Franz, Regulatory Innovation and the Institutional Design
of the TRIPS Agreement, in TRIPS PLUS 20, supra note 9, at 279, 307
("[T]o rejuvenate TRIPS as an innovation-friendly treaty ... would
require making TRIPS a 'learning' institution that opens up diverse
paths for members and allows for some experimentation.").
198 As Professor Reichman explained:
To the extent that intellectual property laws do play an ancillary but
important role, there are, roughly speaking, two different approaches on
the table. One is to play it safe by sticking to time-tested [intellectual
property] solutions implemented in OECD countries, with perhaps a
relatively greater emphasis on the flexibilities still permitted under
TRIPS (and not overridden by relevant [free trade agreements]). The
other approach is to embark on a more experimental path . . . that
advanced technology countries currently find so daunting.
Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in the Twenty-First
Century: Will the Developing Countries Lead or Follow?, 46 Hous. L.
REv. 1115, 1126 (2009).
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Ideally, all developing countries should
experimentally be testing different
approaches to stimulating and disseminating
innovation in their national and regional
systems of innovation and to defining the
relevant supporting legal standards that
could prove effective for different players at
different levels of development, all of whom
are necessarily operating within the incipient
transnational system of innovation. Valid
experiments of this kind should eventually
lead to bottom up proposals for future
intellectual property standards that are
demonstrably consistent with development
goals and that suitably reconcile public and
private interests at national, regional and,
ultimately, global levels. 199
D. Shifting Coalitions
The last observation regards the shifting coalitions
in the international intellectual property regime. Because
coalition building has remained a key strategy for
developing countries to attain the needed leverage vis-a-vis
developed countries, shifts in coalitions can be highly
problematic for the former.200 As I noted in an earlier
article, the development of "intellectual property coalitions
199 Jerome H. Reichman, Richard Lillich Memorial Lecture: Nurturing
a Transnational System of Innovation, 16 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y
143 (2007).
200 See generally Ahmed Abdel Latif, Developing Country
Coordination in International Intellectual Property Standard-Setting
(South Centre, Trade-Related Agenda, Development and Equity
(T.R.A.D.E.) Working Paper No. 24, 2005) (discussing the developing
countries' insufficient coordination in international intellectual property
standard-setting fora); Yu, supra note 1, at 403-06 (discussing
coalition building in the TRIPS context).
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for development" can help developing countries strengthen
their collective bargaining position, influence negotiation
outcomes, and promote effective and democratic decision-
* * 201making in the international intellectual property regime.
Although policymakers and commentators often
refer to the North-South Divide in addressing the
intellectual property debate,20 2 the continuous expansion of
the international intellectual property regime and the
economic and technological rise of emerging countries
* * * * * * 203have made this traditional divide increasingly elusive.
Indeed, many developing countries have now taken policy
and negotiation positions that they normally will not
201 See generally Peter K. Yu, Building Intellectual Property Coalitions
for Development, in IMPLEMENTING WIPO DEVELOPMENT AGENDA,
supra note 144, at 79.
202 Despite its wide use, this divide does not adequately explain the
dynamics in the TRIPS negotiations. See Ganesan, supra note 66, at
230 ("The Indian film industry was as vociferous as Hollywood on the
prevention of piracy of cinematographic works."); Santos Tarrag6,
supra note 66, at 246 ("The question concerned the appropriation by
patents of inventions involving living materials. In this case, even the
developed countries could not agree on the extent to which that could
be done."); Wasescha, supra note 181, at 178 (noting that the issue on
geographical indications "was not a North-South confrontation, or a
North-North one," but "a New World-Old World divide"); Jayashree
Watal, Patents: An Indian Perspective, in MAKING OF TRIPS
AGREEMENT, supra note 9, at 295, 309 ("On the optional exclusion of
plant and animal inventions, there were considerable intra-North
differences, with Canada in particular opposing the patenting of
multicellular organisms."); Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare and the
Role of the WTO: Reconsidering the TRIPS Agreement, 17 EMORY
INT'L L. REV. 819, 840 (2003) ("Within the specific context of the
TRIPS negotiations, alliances that formed over a variety of subjects
crossed the traditional North-South divisions.").
203 See Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property Negotiations, the BRICS
Factor and the Changing North-South Debate, in BRICS-LAWYERS'
GUIDE, supra note 137, at 148-49 (noting the increasing difficulty in
viewing the disagreement between developed and developing countries
through a North-South lens).
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204assume under a Global South perspective. These
positions have been further complicated by the changing
configurations of local industries.205
In the early 2000s, policymakers in developing
countries and their supportive commentators began to push
for stronger protection for traditional knowledge and
206traditional cultural expressions. This effort put these
policymakers and commentators in an awkward position
that did not align well with their traditional pro-
development views on intellectual property law and policy.
As I noted in an earlier article:
204 See supra text accompanying note 140 (providing sources that
discuss why many emerging countries are now willing to accept higher
intellectual property standards); Yu, supra note 203, at 169 ("Although
Brazil, China and India still want to retain leadership in the developing
world, they have also sided with developed countries in many
negotiations-or at least in the negotiation of many items."); Yu, supra
note 32, at 704-05 (noting the "growing need to develop new
taxonomies to describe the different, and at times complex, positions
taken by China, India, and other emerging countries"); Yu, supra note
7, at 111 ("Although [emerging countries] continue to resist the
positions taken by the European Union, the United States and other
developed countries, and they may decline to take the same path
trodden by these countries, they have also slowly embraced intellectual
property reforms to promote economic and technological
developments." (footnote omitted)).
205 See Okediji, supra note 27, at 249 ("[A] variety of new actors will
have the space to participate in shaping the intersection between
multilateral [intellectual property] obligations and the domestic welfare
imperatives that animate that generation and their communities.");
Dwijen Rangnekar, Context and Ambiguity in the Making of Law: A
Comment on Amending India's Patent Act, 10 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP.
365, 379-80 (2007) (noting the changing configuration of Indian
pharmaceutical firms); Peter K. Yu, Access to Medicines, BRICS
Alliances, and Collective Action, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 345, 390-91
(2008) (noting the dynamic development of the pharmaceutical sector
in the BRICS countries).
206 See supra text accompanying notes 66-70.
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Those who are sympathetic to the plight of
less developed countries often consider
themselves low-protectionists, who favor
limited protection of intellectual property.
To them, it is very important to have more
access to generic drugs, open source
software, and non-copyright-protected
textbooks. However, as far as traditional
knowledge is concerned, this group often
finds itself on the side of high-protectionists,
along with Big Pharma and multinational
agrochemical conglomerates. As much as
they want to have free and open access to
copyrighted and patented products, they also
believe that the same free access to
indigenous knowledge and materials would
lead to biopiracy that could jeopardize the
heritage and culture of indigenous
communities-or worse, threaten the very
survival of these communities.207
For instance, at the inaugural A2K conference at
Yale Law School in April 2006, which took place shortly
after the publication of the 2006 article, some advocates of
open-source software were surprised that their developing
country allies actually preferred stronger protection of
intellectual property rights in the area of traditional
knowledge and traditional cultural expressions.2 0 8 There is
simply no easy way to reconcile the two conflicting
207 Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and the Information Ecosystem,
2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (footnotes omitted).
20 Access to Knowledge Conference at Yale Law School (Apr. 21-23,
2006). This observation is based on my personal recollection of the
conference. I moderated the panel on "Political Economy of A2K."
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positions, unless one abandons doctrinal coherence to focus
209
primarily on developing country interests.
Today, we face a different set of conflicting
positions-this time because of the rise of Brazil, China,
India, and other emerging countries.210 Policymakers in
these countries and their supportive commentators have
traditionally argued for weaker intellectual property
protection and enforcement in view of the developing
countries' weaker economic and technological conditions.
Nevertheless, as emerging countries become more
economically and technologically successful, this
traditional position no longer fits well with the countries'
current conditions and future aspirations.2 11 This changing
position is in large part why emerging countries have begun
to embrace higher intellectual property standards, as
revealed in the RCEP and other negotiations.212
To complicate matters even further, many of these
emerging countries have highly uneven development across
the country. Take China, for example. Although
commentators have noted the country's economic rise and
209 See Yu, note 70, at 559 ("[F]rom a doctrinal standpoint, it is hard to
reconcile this proposal with the other demands of less developed
countries for greater autonomy, policy space, and flexibilities.").
210 See discussion supra Section I.E.
211 See Ganesan, supra note 66, at 250 ("The TRIPS Agreement is no
longer as emotive and explosive an issue in India as it was at the time
of its negotiation. The main reason behind this change is the increasing
outward orientation of India's economic policies and the growing
strength and confidence of its economy."); Hiroyuki Odagiri et al.,
Conclusion, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT, AND
CATCH-UP: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE STUDY 412, 424-26
(Hiroyuki Odagiri et al. eds., 2010) (noting that a desirable intellectual
property regime may vary over the course of development stages).
212 See supra text accompanying note 140.
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its status as the world's second-largest economy,2 1 3 China's
economic power still does not compare favorably with that
of the United States or the European Union. When
analyzed on a per capita basis, China ranks in only the
middle among upper-middle-income countries, which the
World Bank defined as having "a GNI per capita between
$3,996 and $12,375," calculated using the World Bank
Atlas method.2 14  While China had a GNI per capita of
$9470 in 2018, the equivalent figures for Japan, South
Korea, and the United States were around, or more than,
four times that amount-$41,340, $30,600, and $62,850
respectively.2 1 5 Even Malaysia's GNI per capita of
216$10,460 was higher than that of China.
In the near future, we will likely see another
awkward position shift in the electronic commerce or
217digital trade area. Such a shift would complicate, if not
213 Although most commentators have placed China as the world's
second largest economy, some suggested that China might already have
been the largest based on select metrics. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, The
Chinese Century, VANITY FAIR (Jan. 2015), https://www.vanityfair.
com/news/2015/01/china-worlds-largest-economy [https://penna.cc/67
XK-ELXF] ("2014 was the last year in which the United States could
claim to be the world's largest economic power. China enters 2015 in
the top position, where it will likely remain for a very long time, if not
forever.").
214 World Bank Country and Lending Groups, WORLD BANK,
https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-wo
rld-bank-country-and-lending-groups [https://perma.cc/W427-ZC5K]
(last visited Feb. 20, 2019).
215 GNI Per Capita, Atlas Method (Current US$), WORLD BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gnp.pcap.cd [https://penna.cc/
494C-TD5V] (last visited Feb. 20, 2019); see also Yu, supra note 189,
at 10 ("Given the 1.4 billion-high population, China's gross domestic
product per capita will always remain low, even if it has actively and
successfully competed with others on the aggregate l vel.").
216 GNI Per Capita, Atlas Method (Current US$), supra note 215.
217 See supra note 73 (providing sources discussing trade-related
developments in the electronic commerce or digital trade area).
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upset, the developing countries' coalitions at the WTO,
WIPO, and other international fora.2 18  Thus far, those
policymakers and commentators who are eager to support
the development of strong intellectual property industries
have argued for greater protection and enforcement as well
as the affirmation of the territoriality principle, which they
consider a bedrock of the intellectual property system.2 19
218 See Ruth L. Okediji, The International Relations of Intellectual
Property: Narratives of Developing Country Participation in the
Global Intellectual Property System, 7 SING. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 315,
373 (2003) ("[T]o the extent regime shifting upsets coalitional
dynamics between developing countries, the loss on the development
side is actually doubled. Not only is there a dilution of a normative
proposition, however subtle, but there is also the political loss resulting
from splinters between developing countries whose membership in
various regimes may be different, or whose position on issues within
the regimes may differ."); Yu, supra note 205, at 371-72 ("The
growing complexities have . . . upset the existing coalition dynamics
between actors and institutions within the international trading system,
thus threatening to reduce the bargaining power and influence the less
developed world has obtained through past coalition-building
initiatives."); Peter K. Yu, International Enclosure, the Regime
Complex, and Intellectual Property Schizophrenia, 2007 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 1, 17-18 (discussing how "the increased complexity of the
international intellectual property regime has upset existing coalition
dynamics between actors and institutions within the regime complex");
see also Ruth L. Okediji, The International Copyright System:
Limitations, Exceptions and Public Interest Considerations for
Developing Countries 16 Int'l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev., Issue
Paper No. 15 (2006), https://unctad.org/en/docs/iteipc2006len.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5368-Q4XL] ("In a digital era, the interests of
developing countries ironically overlap with those of consumers in
developed countries.").
219 See Berne Convention, supra note 98, art. 5(3) ("Protection in the
country of origin is governed by domestic law."); Paris Convention,
supra note 97, art. 4bis(1) ("Patents applied for ... by nationals of a
country of the Union shall be independent of patents obtained for the
same invention in other countries"); August 30 Decision, supra note
158, ¶ 6(i) (noting "the territorial nature of the patent rights"); Peter K.
Yu, A Hater's Guide to Geoblocking, 25 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 503,
516 (2019) ("For many, territoriality remains the bedrock principle of
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Yet, in the electronic commerce or digital trade area, these
policymakers and commentators increasingly find
themselves arguing for the free flow of information and
220deterritorialization. Indeed, many intellectual property
rights holders have found data localization requirements
- 221highly problematic.
In sum, as the international intellectual property
regime continues to expand, and as new issue areas are
being incorporated into what commentators have described
as the "international intellectual property regime
complex,"222 the law and policy debate will become
the copyright system"); Peter K. Yu, A Spatial Critique of Intellectual
Property Law and Policy, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2045, 2064 (2017)
[hereinafter Yu, Spatial Critique] ("Territoriality is the bedrock
principle of the intellectual property system, whether the protection
concerns copyrights, patents, trademarks, or other forms of intellectual
property rights.").
220 See DAVID DELANEY, TERRITORY: A SHORT INTRODUCTION 2, 15
(2008) (advancing the concepts of "reterritorialization" and
"deterritorialization"); Yu, Spatial Critique, supra note 219, at 2111
("The introduction of the Internet and other new communications
technologies has greatly eroded-or 'deterritorialized'-the traditional
boundaries used to protect intellectual property rights." (footnote
omitted)); see also Justice [Robin] Jacob, International Intellectual
Property Litigation in the Next Millennium, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 507, 516 (2000) ("[A]s time goes on, . .. the world will realize that
at least for intellectual property the days of the nation-state are over.").
221 See generally Anupam Chander & Uyin P. L6, Data Nationalism,
64 EMORY L.J. 677 (2015) (discussing data localization requirements
from around the world); Gao, supra note 73, at 297 (discussing the
difference between the Chinese approach and the U.S. approach to
digital trade).
222 See Yu, supra note 218, at 2 (coining the term "intellectual property
regime complex"); see also David W. Leebron, Linkages, 96 AM. J.
INT'L L. 5, 18 (2002) (discussing "conglomerate regime"); Kal
Raustiala & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic
Resources, 58 INT'L ORG. 277, 279 (2004) (introducing the term
"regime complex" and discussing the development of a regime
complex in the area of plant genetic resources). See generally Martti
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increasingly fragmented and incoherent. In this
environment, policymakers and commentators will have
greater difficulty reconciling their doctrinally inconsistent
positions. Such difficulty would not only undermine
rhetorical effectiveness but would also deeply affect the
developing countries' ability to build coalitions to
strengthen their collective bargaining positions, influence
negotiation outcomes, and promote effective and
democratic decision-making in the international intellectual
-223property regime.
IV. FUTURE ROLES
The two previous Parts have explored TRIPS
developments in the past twenty-five years, with a focus on
developing countries. The lingering question is what will
happen to the TRIPS Agreement in the near future,
especially in light of the current deadlocks at the Doha
Development Round of Trade Negotiations2 2 4 and the
United States' reduced support for the WTO Appellate
Body? 2 2 5 Viewing the issue from the developing countries'
Koskenniemi, Fragmentation ofInternational Law: Difficulties Arising
from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law Report
of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) (identifying the challenges posed by the
growing fragmentation of international law); Eyal Benvenisti & George
W. Downs, The Empire's New Clothes: Political Economy and the
Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REv. 595, 596-600
(2007) (discussing growing "proliferation of international regulatory
institutions with overlapping jurisdictions and ambiguous boundaries");
Yu, supra note 218, at 13-21 (discussing development of "international
intellectual property regime complex").
223 See generally Yu, supra note 201.
224 See Yu, TPP and Trans-Pacific Perplexities, supra note 40, at 1140
(noting the "deadlocks" at the Doha Round).
225 See generally Joost Pauwelyn, WTO Dispute Settlement Post 2019:
What to Expect? What Choice to Make?, 22 J. INT'L ECON. L. 297
(2019) (discussing the future of the WTO dispute settlement process).
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perspective, this Part identifies three active roles that the
TRIPS Agreement will continue to play in the near future.
A. Lingering Influence
The first active role concerns the TRIPS
Agreement's lingering influence. Because the development
of international intellectual property law has been highly
path-dependent,2 2 6 the TRIPS Agreement will continue to
exert influence on WTO members. Although the Paris and
Berne Conventions were established in the 1880s, both
Conventions have now been incorporated by reference into
227the TRIPS Agreement. 2 Such incorporation explains in
part why the TRIPS Agreement has had far-reaching
impacts on developing countries, even though its new
enforcement and test data norms have not had much
success in harmonizing national intellectual property
standards .228
In the future, the TRIPS Agreement will likely exert
influence the same way the Paris and Berne Conventions
do. First, the TRIPS provisions have been, and will
continue to be, incorporated by reference into future
226 See SARA BANNERMAN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND ACCESS
TO KNOWLEDGE 2 (2016) (noting that "[t]he international copyright
system in its current form ... is a set of principles that arose out of
chance and path dependency"); Okediji, supra note 218, at 338 ("The
progression from state practice to bilateralism, to multilateralism to
regionalism[,] reveals a classic form of evolutionary path dependency
in the development of international intellectual property law."); Yu,
supra note 116, at 105 ("[T]he international intellectual property
system is highly path-dependent. The impact of such dependency
becomes even greater when the path is broadened to cover
coevolutionary developments with the international economic and
trading systems."); Yu, supra note 183, at 153-55 (discussing the path
dependence in intellectual property law).
227 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 2.1, 9.1.
228 See supra text accompanying notes 100-10.
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bilateral, regional, and plurilateral trade agreements. For
instance, the TPP Agreement built on the TRIPS
Agreement, and fifteen TPP provisions made references to
the latter.22 9 Second, developing countries can use TRIPS
standards as negotiation baselines or the starting points for
draft negotiation texts. Some developing countries have
already used these standards to explain why their countries
have offered sufficient levels of intellectual property
protection and enforcement.2 3 0 Third, technical assistance
experts will use TRIPS standards as international
benchmarks.2 3 1  Given the wide adoption of the TRIPS
229 TPP Agreement, supra note 40, arts. 18.1, 18.6, 18.8, 18.10, 18.20,
18.39, 18.41, 18.50, 18.55, 18.64, 18.65, 18.71, 18.74, 18.78, 18.82.
230 See supra text accompanying note 20. To preempt these defenses,
the U.S. Trade Act of 2002 stipulates expressly that the USTR can take
Section 301 actions against countries that have failed to provide
"adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights
notwithstanding the fact that [they] may be in compliance with the
specific obligations of the [TRIPS] Agreement." 19 U.S.C. §
241 1(d)(3)(B)(i)(II) (2018) (emphasis added).
231 Article 67 of the TRIPS Agreement lays down the obligation
concerning technical cooperation:
In order to facilitate the implementation of this Agreement, developed
country Members shall provide, on request and on mutually agreed
terms and conditions, technical and financial cooperation in favour of
developing and least-developed country Members. Such cooperation
shall include assistance in the preparation of laws and regulations on
the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights as well as
on the prevention of their abuse, and shall include support regarding the
establishment or reinforcement of domestic offices and agencies
relevant to these matters, including the training of personnel.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 67; see also DEERE, supra note
15, at 180-86, 278-85 (discussing institutional capacity building in the
intellectual property context); Duncan Matthews & Viviana Mufioz-
Tellez, Bilateral Technical Assistance and TRIPS: The United States,
Japan and the European Communities in Comparative Perspective, 9 J.
WORLD INTELL. PROP. 629, 632 (2006) (discussing the technical
assistance provided by the United States, Japan, and the European
Union in accordance with Article 67 of the TRIPS Agreement);
Christopher May, Capacity Building and the (Re) production of
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Agreement by more than 160 WTO members,2 3 2 there are
simply no better examples than these standards.
B. Catch-up Model
The second active role that the TRIPS Agreement
will play relates to the catch-up model it offers. While the
experiences of Brazil, China, India, and other emerging
countries have shown the limitations of the TRIPS formula
for strengthening economic and technological capabilities
in developing countries, there are still many success stories.
Indeed, without the reforms induced by the TRIPS
Agreement and the WTO, many emerging countries are
unlikely to quickly and greatly increase these
capabilities.2 3 3
It is certainly fair to question whether these
increased capabilities are attributed to the TRIPS
Agreement or the WTO (which provides developing
countries with concessions in other trade sectors, such as
agriculture and textiles).2 34 Nevertheless, the WTO's
Intellectual Property Rights, 25 THIRD WORLD Q. 821 (2004)
(discussing intellectual property capacity building in developing
countries); Yu, supra note 44, at 109 (discussing technical assistance in
relation to the TPP Agreement).
232 See Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/tif e/org6_e.htm [https
://perma.cc/K397-4XWF] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019) (providing a list
of WTO members).
233 See discussion supra Section I.E.
234 It is not uncommon for policymakers and trade negotiators in
developed countries to point out that developing countries have secured
significant gains in non-intellectual property areas through the WTO
even if the standards in the TRIPS Agreement might not have been in
their best interests. See Yu, supra note 1, at 371 ("While developed
countries received stronger protection for intellectual property rights
and a reduction in restrictions against foreign direct investment, less
developed countries obtained, in return, lower tariffs on textiles and
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"single undertaking" arrangement235 has made it very
difficult, if not impossible, to separate the TRIPS
contributions from the WTO contributions.2 3 6
agriculture and protection via the mandatory dispute settlement process
against unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States and other
developed countries."); see also Yu, supra note 26, at 385 ("The
problem with the TRIPS Agreement is not that it is one-sided. It is
expected to be one-sided, given the cross-sector bargaining undertaken
during the negotiation process."). During the TRIPS negotiations,
developing countries were also repeatedly told that the TRIPS
Agreement, along with other commitments in the WTO, would provide
the painful medicine they need to boost economic development. See
Gervais, supra note 54, at 43 (noting that developing countries "were
told to overlook the distasteful aspects of introducing or increasing
intellectual property protection and enforcement in exchange for
longer-term economic health"); see also Edmund W. Kitch, The Patent
Policy of Developing Countries, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 166, 166-
67 (1994) (arguing that developing countries agreed to stronger
intellectual property protection during the TRIPS negotiations because
they found such protection in their self-interests).
235 See How the Negotiations Are Organized, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dda e/work organie.htm [https
://perma.cc/X9F8-4KE8] (last visited Sept. 3, 2019) ("Single
undertaking: Virtually every item of the negotiation is part of a whole
and indivisible package and cannot be agreed separately. 'Nothing is
agreed until everything is agreed."').
236 As I noted in an earlier article:
[D]espite having the burden of assuming WTO-plus obligations in
intellectual property and other areas, China has been doing very well
since it joined the international trading body. Although one can
certainly debate whether the country's success in the intellectual
property area actually originated from the WTO or its TRIPS
Agreement-an important distinction-the WTO's "single
undertaking" approach has virtually guaranteed that China could not
have obtained benefits from non-intellectual property reforms without
also implementing TRIPS-based reforms.
Yu, supra note 189, at 12; see also KURT M. CAMPBELL, THE PIVOT:
THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN STATECRAFT IN ASIA 195 (2016) ("The last
time China signed on to a difficult trade agreement was when it joined
the WTO, and after a period of costly but necessary domestic reforms,
it benefited dramatically."); Yu, supra note 121, at 550 ("[T]he push
for China to strengthen intellectual property protection has resulted in
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To a large extent, the TRIPS Agreement has
provided an incomplete model for economic and
technological catch-up. This model is neither sufficient nor
necessary, but it can be beneficial. Economists have
reminded us time and again the importance of introducing
complementary policy reforms. For instance, Keith
Maskus underscored the importance of the development of
"an overall pro-competitive business environment,"
drawing on intellectual property protection, investment
regulations, tax and production incentives, trade policies,
and competition rules.2 37  In relation to the use of
intellectual property reform to attract foreign direct
investment, Claudio Frischtak reminded us that a country's
overall investment climate often has greater influence on
the slow and paradoxical erosion of the United States' competitive
position."); Gordon G. Chang, TPP vs. RCEP: America and China
Battle for Control of Pacific Trade, NAT'L INTEREST (Oct. 6, 2015),
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/tpp-vs-rcep-america-china-battle-cont
rol-pacific-trade-14021 [https://penna.cc/JB29-57FS] ("[China] reaped
large gains after it joined the World Trade Organization in December
2001, due mostly to the reforms required by its accession agreement.").
237 Keith E. Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in
Encouraging Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer, 9
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 109, 129 (1998); see also DRAHOS WITH
BRAITHWAITE, supra note 112, at 202 ("[S]ocieties must choose their
system for regulating intellectual property with an eye to how it will fit
other crucial legal and industry policy institutions, from competition
policy to labour market policy."); Odagiri et al., supra note 211, at
420-21 (discussing the need to consider the role of an intellectual
property regime alongside that of other government policies); Daniel
Gervais, Of Clusters and Assumptions: Innovation as Part of a Full
TRIPS Implementation, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 2353, 2355 (2009)
("[M]echanical implementations of TRIPS are unlikely to generate
positives measured in terms of domestic innovation and may generate
significant administrative and welfare costs.").
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investment decisions than the strength of intellectual
238
property protection. Jerome Reichman concurred:
Intellectual property rights are but one
component of overall economic growth; that
different states have different factor
endowments; and that in many countries,
especially those at an early stage of
development, a sound agricultural policy or
a sound pro-competitive industrial policy
with a supportive political and legal
infrastructure are more likely to stimulate
economic growth than intellectual property
laws.239
Moreover, even if the development of a well-
functioning intellectual property system is critical to
improving the developing countries' economic and
technological capabilities, policymakers in these countries
should carefully optimize their system according to local
conditions. As Josh Lerner wrote: "Almost all economists
would agree that some intellectual property protection is
better than no intellectual property protection at all. But
this does not mean that very strong protection is better than
a more moderate level of protection."2 4 0 The need for more
moderate levels of protection explains in part why
emerging countries have chosen to undertake "selective
adaptation."24 1 It is also worth remembering that many
developing countries start to find the TRIPS Agreement
238 Claudio R. Frischtak, Harmonization Versus Differentiation in
Intellectual Property Rights Regime, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 68,
99-100 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993).
239 Reichman, supra note 198, at 1117.
240 Josh Lerner, The Patent System in a Time of Turmoil, 2 WIPO J. 28,
32 (2010).
241 See discussion supra Section II.C.
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palatable, or at least more palatable, because they have
attained the requisite levels of economic and technological
developments that would allow the countries to benefit
242from the Agreement.
C. Reinterpreted Safeguards
The third active role that the TRIPS Agreement will
play pertains to its various safeguards that have now been
strengthened or reinterpreted to the developing countries'
benefit. Many of the Agreement's early critics will likely
find the use of this Agreement as a shield to protect
developing countries counterintuitive, if not absurd.24 3
Nevertheless, three reasons explain why the TRIPS
Agreement may now accommodate the developing
countries' interests better than i the past.
First, as noted earlier, many developing countries
have now risen to the level where TRIPS standards can be
beneficial. Not only is it unlikely for these "relatively
timid and permissive" standards-in Professor Sell's
words2 4 4  to provide developed countries with
comparative advantages, but these standards will actually
help developing countries attain comparative advantages
over other developing countries. In addition, because
TRIPS standards were set up at the WTO, these standards
will allow reformers in developing countries to push
242 See Yu, Copyright Norm-setting, supra note 83, at 39-41
(discussing whether the RCEP members would favor stronger levels of
intellectual property protection and enforcement); Yu, RCEP and
Trans-Pacific Norms, supra note 83, at 731-40 (discussing the
dilemma confronting intellectual property policymakers in the Asia-
Pacific region).
243 But see Yu, supra note 181, at 1025-31 (discussing the use of
Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement as a shield against aggressive
demands for increased intellectual property protection).
244 Sell, supra note 51, at 448.
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through domestic intellectual property reforms without
expending too much political capital.2 45
Second, in the past twenty-five years, policymakers
in developing countries and their supportive academic
commentators and nongovernmental organizations have
worked hard to strengthen flexibilities in the TRIPS
246
Agreement and to reinterpret that Agreement. As
Section I.C has noted, such reinterpretations have occurred
both inside and outside the international intellectual
245 As I noted earlier in the RCEP context:
Some leaders in ... emerging countries may ... welcome new RCEP
requirements for stronger intellectual property protection and
enforcement. After all, those requirements will provide these leaders
with the much-needed external push to accelerate domestic intellectual
property reforms. In China, for example, the standards required by the
TRIPS Agreement and the push for accession to the WTO led to a
complete overhaul of its copyright, patent, and trademark laws in the
early 2000s. To many reformist leaders, having their hands tied by
international treaties can sometimes be used as an effective weapon
against hardline leaders and conservative critics at home.
Yu, RCEP and Trans-Pacific Norms, supra note 83, at 726 (footnotes
omitted); see also MARK A. GROOMBRIDGE & CLAUDE E. BARFIELD,
TIGER BY THE TAIL: CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 41
(1999) ("An international institution such as the WTO can help bolster
China's reform leadership against powerful hardliners. International
institutions can tie the hands of leaders in ways that the ineffectual
bilateral relationship is not able to do so."); Peter K. Yu, Intellectual
Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO
OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS-PLus ERA 173, 192
(Daniel J. Gervais ed., 1st ed. 2007) (explaining the benefits of TRIPS
standards to reformist leaders in China); Yu, TRIPS Enforcement
Dispute, supra note 187, at 1107 ("By providing the much-needed
external push that helps reduce resistance from conservative leaders,
the panel report [in China Measures Affecting the Protection and
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights] has helped accelerate
reforms in the area of intellectual property protection and
enforcement.").
246 See supra text accompanying notes 76-80.
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247property regime. As a result, the TRIPS Agreement we
have today better accommodates the interests of developing
countries than the arguably draconian text that these
countries and their policymakers felt was thrusted down
their throats in the mid-1990s. Since the adoption of the
TRIPS Agreement, many developing countries have greatly
strengthened their capabilities to put its flexibilities to
beneficial use.24 8
Finally, in the past three decades, developed
countries have spent remendous time, effort, and energy on
putting TRIPS standards on the international pedestal,
making them the de facto standards for the international
intellectual property regime.2 4 9 The developing countries'
use of these standards, even if reinterpreted, has now
created an estoppel effect. As the proverb goes, "Live by
the sword, die by the sword." 2 5 0  After having pushed
developing countries repeatedly-and, at times,
aggressively-to embrace these standards in the past
quarter-century, it will now be highly hypocritical for
developed countries to insist that those standards are
inappropriate for their less developed counterparts.
247 See discussion Section I.C.
248 See generally Yu, supra note 193, at 329-36 (discussing the
developing countries' growing abilities to play the TRIPS interpretation
game).
249 See Assafa Endeshaw, A Critical Assessment of the U.S.-China
Conflict on Intellectual Property, 6 ALB. L.J. ScI. & TECH. 295, 337
(1996) ("[T]he United States has achieved in placing intellectual
property on an arguably 'international' pedestal (the TRIPs) after
passing through long periods of bilateral arrangements.").
250 See Matthew 26:52 (King James) ("Put up again thy sword into his
place: for all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword.").
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V. CONCLUSION
When the TRIPS Agreement was adopted in April
1994, many developing countries were discontent with the
high standards that the WTO had imposed upon them. Not
only did they fear that the Agreement would slow down
their catch-up efforts, but they were also concerned about
the impacts TRIPS-related reforms might have on the
countries' political, economic, social, cultural, and
technological developments. As I noted in the 2006 article:
"[From the developing countries' perspective, the TRIPS-
based international intellectual property] system fails to
take into consideration their needs, interests, and local
conditions. The strong protection mandated under the
TRIPs Agreement also threatens their much-needed access
to information, knowledge, and essential medicines."2 51
By the time the TRIPS Agreement celebrated its
silver anniversary, many developing countries seem to have
become content with this once dreaded Agreement. Some
emerging countries have also started to appreciate the
benefits provided by the Agreement. While enough
empirical evidence has shown the inappropriateness of
fully implementing TRIPS standards in developing
countries in the mid-1990s252 -and, for some, even
today25 3 -the emerging countries' greatly improved
251 Yu, supra note 1, at 370.
252 See Peter K. Yu, The Comparative Economics of International
Intellectual Property Agreements, in COMPARATIVE LAW AND
ECONOMICS 282, 283-84 (Theodore Eisenberg & Giovanni B. Ramello
eds., 2016) (providing empirical evidence in this area).
253 As Graeme Dinwoodie and Rochelle Dreyfuss observed:
Many of the Southern countries did not have a comprehensive
intellectual property system prior to entry into the WTO. Despite WTO
membership, a low level of protection is still appropriate for their
internal needs and will likely remain so for a considerable length of
time. In some, the population is largely impoverished. By raising the
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economic and technological conditions have now made it
possible for them to benefit from TRIPS-based reforms.
The past twenty-five years have therefore shown the
gradual evolution of one of the most comprehensive and
influential international intellectual property agreements, as
well as the changing perceptions and assessments of that
Agreement in both the developed and developing worlds.
Although it remains to be seen whether developing
countries will eventually extol the benefits of the TRIPS
Agreement the same way developed countries did shortly
after the Agreement's adoption, the developing countries'
growing support of this Agreement reminds us of the
dynamic nature of international intellectual property
developments. Such dynamism explains why the
Agreement has continued to attract attention from
policymakers and commentators. It also suggests the need
for redux treatments of those articles on the TRIPS
Agreement that were published in the 1990s and 2000s.
cost of food, medicine, and books, strong intellectual property
protection can substantially decrease access to nutrition, health, and
education. And because these countries are not operating at the
technological frontier, they are unlikely to see many offsetting benefits
from enhanced intellectual property protection. Indeed, under a variety
of economic models, it is clear that any agreement that creates efficient
levels of intellectual property protection, when measured from the
perspective of developed countries, will have significant distributive
consequences for the South. Even if strong protection were confined to
the North, the South might suffer in that intellectual property rights can
raise the cost of humanitarian efforts to create products-such as
medicines and nutritious plants-that meet the needs of its citizens.
DINWOODIE & DREYFUSS, supra note 15, at 10-11 (footnote omitted).
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